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HISTORICAL ~ACKGROUND 
Irritating indeed was the diplomatic dispute over the nAla-
baman claims. Frequently did it threaten to unlock the flood-
gates of a third Anglo-American war; but fortunately the saner 
counsels of 1871 prevailed, so that today the Treaty of Washing-
ton is a landmark in the not too glorious history of successful 
arbitration.l 
Now that the applause for the Geneva Convention has died 
out, and the salvos of artillery, heralding the victory of peace, 
are long silent, might it not be profitable to examine the press 
opinion of those four important months, February, March, April 
and May, 1871? These months witnessed an exciting game of di-
plomatic ngive and taken, a game that resulted in the celebrated 
Treaty of Washington on May 8, 1871. 
American editorial opinion will best be appreciated after a 
simple resume of those salient facts which caused Anglo-American 
friction. Mid-way in the Civil War our country was face to face 
with a grave diplomatic crisis. It grew out of Confederate Com-
merce destroyers. Southern privateering had proved unsuccessful 
1 C.G. Fenwick, International Law, N.Y., 1924; 405, 564. 
1 
2 
because it could not be pursued with profit; but if government-
operated co~~erce destroyers should sail the seas, they could be 
used with devastating effect. The Confederacy, lacking ship-
building facilities, turned to the shipyards of England. This 
was the move that disturbed the calm of Anglo-American relations. 
In fact it caused a storm of hostility that did not subside un-
til the early 1870's. 
The South had not turned to England in vain. Soon the news 
came that commerce destroyers were sailing secretly from British 
shipyards. The Lincoln government became alarmed, and right-
fully so, because the American Merchant Marine was being driven 
from the high seas.2 Although our Minister to Great Britain, 
Charles Francis Adams, lost no time in citing to the British the 
illegalities involved, English statesmen, however, clung 
tenaciously to a circumvention of their own neutrality law, as 
the lucrative but illegal trade went on.3 
2 T.A. Bailey, A Dinlgmati~ H;story ~ Lhe American People, 
Crofts & Co., New York, 1944; 370. The impact of the Civil 
War upon the American merchant marine is clearly indicated 
by F.W. Owsley, K!ng Cotton Diplomacy, 574-576. 
3 Bailey, QQ.cit., 371. The problems that faced the British 
Government in 1861-1865 with regard to "commerce destroyers" 
being built in her ports are given classic treatment in E.D. 
Adams, Great Britain And 1he American Civil ~' II, 116-151. 
See also Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird Rams" 
Proceedings Q! ~Massachusetts Historical SQciety, xLV, 
243-333, and for the British viewpoint, see M. Bernard, A 
Historical Account .21. the Neutral:Jty .Q.!. Great Britain during 
the Amer~can Civil~' (London, 1870). 
3 
Whether the construction of such ships w~.s contrary to 
international law is still contested. President Lincoln and his 
cabinet wanted one thing--strict English neutrality. And it was 
this that Mr. P.dams was instructed to obtain. 
In May, 1862, the "Alabama", then known as the "290", was 
launched at Birkenhead and went off the English coast for an al-
leged shakedown cruise. The ship never returned. She reached 
the Azores unmolested. It was here tr~t she received her com-
mission as a Confederate cruiser and was christened the "Alabama". 
Forthwith she took on armament that made her a formidable man-
of-war. 4· 
From the time that the "Alabaman and her sister frigates 
proceeded to "light the skies from Europe to the Far East with 
the burning hulks of Yankee Merchant-men", the North .faced a 
real crisis. Diplomatic duels between Adams and Lord Russell 
.followed one upon the other. Despite most emphatic protests 
from our State Department, Downing Street took no action. 
4 S.F. Bemis, A Dinlomatiq History Q! Lha ~., New York, 
1936. See Also J.F. Rhodes A H1story a!~~., V.6, 
88-89. Bailey (~.cit., 37i) remarks that the ship's 
sides were actually pierced .for guns in England and that 
it was common knowledge among the workmen that she was 
being constructed .for the Confederecy. 
4 
English inactivity, however, was confined to the Foreign Of~ 
fice; shipbuilders continued to build for the South. One com-
pany5 was now perfecting "iron clads" or rams, a naval wedge that 
may well have opened the blockade, swept the American merchant 
marine off the sea, and won the Southern war for independence. 
But Southern independence was not to be. News reached Lo~ 
don of Northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. This 
timely success strengthened Adams' hand. Aiming to prevent any 
"iron clads" from slipping out of British ports, our minister 
made his oft-quoted declaration to Russell, "It would be super-
fluous to point out to your Lordship that this is war". The 
ultimatum was hardly necessary, for already some British states-
men saw the handwriting on the wall. To show~ will,7 the 
"iron clads" were purchased by Her Majesty's Government. With 
this ge'Sture the initial chapter of the "Alabama" diplomacy was 
closed. 
Immediately after the Civil War the general international 
situation threatened to involve Great Britain in another mari-
time war, a fact of tremendous importance in the ultimate 
5 Lairds, and Co. at Birkenhead. For details see Bailey, ~· 
cit., 371. 
6 c:F. Adams, Jr., Cha:r:le.a [rancis Adam:~ (N.Y., 1900) 341-348. 
7 Note the recurrence of this term as a diplomatic covering 
for real motives. 
5 
settlement of the "Alabama" affair. This factor should be borne 
in mind as throwing strong light on the progress of the Joint 
High Commission and the conclusion of the Washington Treaty. 
Britain was having her difficulties in the Far East with Japan, 
while at home European complications, incidental to the contin-
ental wars and the consolidation of the German empire, made peace 
all too problematical. It was under such pressing circumstances 
that thoughtful Englishmen began to realize the blunders made by 
the home government in handling American affairs during the Civil 
War.8 Among themselves cagey Englishmen "regretted" any~ 
friendliness to the Union cause and "hoped" that they had not set 
a precedent for fitting out warships for belligerent nations b,y 
benign neutrals. They conjectured, and perhaps rightly, that the 
seas would swarm with new "Alabamasn to destroy British co~~erce 
everywhere, unless a more conciliatory attitude were taken 
towards settling the "Alabama" claims by arbitration. 
Yet despite this fine opportunity for a quick settlement, 
delay after delay ensued. The incompetency of our diplomatic 
corps was the main obstacle to satisfactory negotiations. The 
worst offender in this regard was Reverdy Johnson, our minister 
8 Bemis, QQ.cit., 405. 
6 
to Great Britain. 9 A recital of his antics cannot be included in 
this brief historical survey; it suffices to say that Johnson was 
not the man to be in England. What little patriotism and appre-
ciation of the dignity of his position this man did have was 
often submerged in the flow of good wine. 
Before his recall, however, Johnson effected one agreement 
with the British, the Johnson-Clarendon Convention. It was a 
treaty des~ised by the American people and bitterly scorned by 
the American press. Since not a single provision was made to 
treat of the "Alabama" claims, let alone the slightest suggestion 
of an apology, when the treaty was brought before the United 
States Senate for ratification, it met with instantaneous rejec-
tion by the overwhelming vote of 54 to 1. 
The rejection of this treaty was one of the first diplomatic 
moves of the new Grant administration. On the floor of the 
Senate the sentimental and sometimes fanatically inclined Charles 
9 Rhodes, ~·sii· 1 _~36. For a defense of Johnson see B.C. Steiner's, Ina~ Q! Reyerdz Johnson, Baltimore, 1914, 
236 ff. In the opinion of Watterson, the partisan 
editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, (May 26~ 1871) 
"our country was never represented bY a more astu~e or 
more qualified diplomatist. A man of patrician habits, 
antecedents and belongings, Reverdy Johnson • • • bril-
liant sta~esman, jurists and gentleman (who) • • • will 
receive justice after death". 
7 
sumner delivered a vitriolic speech in opposition to the proposed 
treaty.lO This verbal lashing proved to be a boomerang. Gi~ted 
with more vehemence than prudence, Sumner took quite an untenable 
stand, namely, the annexation of Canada as part compensation ~or 
the "Alabama" depredations. He also pressed a most ~orbidding 
claim ~or indirect damages. Such outrageous demands angered 
England into a forgetfulness of her precarious international 
situation and all diplomatic negotiations were suspended for 
several months. 
Still the ticklish international situation persisted. With 
war threatening at every turn, the roaring lion of Britain soon 
forgot his anger. The definitely unwholesome and forbidding 
prospect of powers like Germany, Russia, and Japan unleashing a 
whole fleet of "American-built Alabamas" upon Britain made Brit-
ish diplomats even more tractable than before the Sumner incident 
Now as she wished to wipe out the memory of her own un-neutral 
policy o~ Civil War days, she determined to make amends for the 
10 Bailey, 22·~., 410-411. The role of Charles Sumner is 
somewhat disputed. A majority of the press seems harsh in 
describing his attitude toward the Treaty of Washington. 
In this regard the reader should consult E.L. Pierce, 
M~mott ~ Letters ~ Charles Sumner, vol. IV; c.c. Tansill, 
!b& llnited States ~nd Santo pominio, (Baltimore, 1938) 
chap. x; L.B. Shippee, Canadian-American Relation&, 
1849-1874, {New Haven, 1939). 
8 
harm done by the "Alabama". There is strong evidence that a genu 
ine fear of retribution stimulated the British Foreign Office to 
take the decisive steps which culminated in the meeting of the 
11 Joint High Commission at Washington, D.C. in February, 1871. 
11 Katherine A. Wells, A Study Q! ~ritish pglicy and Qpin1gn, 
1865-1872. This doctoral dissertation presents strong 
evidence that fear of retribution was England's real mo-
tive in agreeing to a Joing High Commission. See "Thesis 
Extract", passim. The Thesis is in the archives of 
Clark u., Worcester, Mass. 
CHAPTER I 
PRESS OPINION ON THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 
JANUARY - APRIL, 1871 
GENERAL APATHY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN 
In early February the British Commissioners arrived in the 
United States. By February 271 1871, the Joint High Commission 
was ready to swing into action at the State Department in Wash-
ington. The ~act that a joint commission ever assembled in a~ 
place is noteworthy. A~~airs looked very black indeed all 
through January. The New York W?rld le~t ~all a sarcastic tear 
when it observed: 
• • • poor old England • • • if things go on 
in this fashion America out of sheer disdain 
and contempt will have to abandon all idea 
o~ insisting u9on redress for the Alabama in-juries • • • one can fight with a strong man 
who has insulted and wronged you, but what 
can you do with a poor old woman who humbly 
crouches be~ore you, and insists1that she loves to be despised and kicked? 
The same New York World had several editorial comments to 
make on Britain's "partial" neutrality to the South. England· 
knew better during the Civil War, "but she did not endeavour 
1 January 3, 1871. Perhaps this is a play for the Irish vote 
in New York. 
10 
to live according to her knowledgen. 2 After all, the paper 
argued, if England could pay deference "to the rights, interests, 
and sensibilities" of Prussia in the summer of 1870, why could. 
not she act in like manner when she negotiated the Johnson-
Clarendon Convention?3 In this ·journal's opinion there is "no 
chance for arbitrationn4 at all. The Boston Advertiser observed 
the same "British subserviency to Prussia" and pointed out the 
striking contrast evidenced in "our Civil Warn.5 The implica-
tion is obvious. 
Throughout early January 1871 the editors of the New York 
World kept their ear to the ground and their eye on English 
newspapers. A rumor, picked up in France, that: "a Prussian 
courier • • • captured by the Francs near the Belgian border • • 
was carrying despatches urging the United States to press the 
Alabama claims nown,6 was given prominence, though the London 
papers endeavoured to pass it off with a wave of the hand: "The 
report is hardly credited heren. 7 At the same time another Lon-
don daily carried a conciliatory article entitled "Let Us Have 
2 ~ ~ Worlg, January 13, 1871. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 February 7, 1871. 
6 ~ York World, January 6, 1871. 
7 London, January 5, quoted in the ~ York World, 
January 6, 1871. 
11 
Peace" in which a settlement of the "Alabaaan claims was urged. 
The article alleged: 
England only desires by fair concessions 
and a frank allowance to bring about a settlement 
of this foolish quarrel which alienates two great 
nations allied by blood and sympathy. 
The clamor of the English press for a settlement prompted 
Gladstone's announcement on January 29 that the ministry was 
doing it~ utmost to bring about such an adjustment. 9 In early 
February our State Department was informed that the British 
Government had agreed to take the final steps in the creation 
of the Joint High Commission.10 
On February 10 the correspondence between Secretary of 
State Hamilton Fish and the British agent, Thornton, went to 
the Senate together with the names of the American Commissioners. 
Previous apathy toward Great Britain on the part of the Ameri-
can press was quickly dispelled. The Chicago Tribu~ offered 
"congratulations to both countriesn11 and expressed high hopes 
"for a quick settlement and payment". Other leading "dailies" 
of the mid-westl2 felt satisfied with· both the proposed 
8 Editorial, London Times, cited in the ll.e.1t Ic.rk World, ibid. 
9 Allan Nevins, Bamilton Fish, N.Y., 1937, 443-444. 
10 Ibid. Nevins quotes liberally from the Fish diary of 
February 3, 1871. 
11 February 11, 1871. 
12 For example, the Indianapolis Journal, Chicago Evening Mail, 
and the Cincinnati Gazette. 
12 
commission and with the names of the British representatives. 
"Earl Grey" was lauded by the Indianapolis Journal "as the clear-
est headed and most rational statesman of England, and a friend 
to American. 13 Thornton's conduct was alleged "to have won the 
respect of all here in the United Statesn.l4 This same confi-
dent tone was adopted by the Chicago Evening ~: 
• • • the names of the Joint Commissioners 
are well known to the American public, and 
we have every reason to hope that both these 
vexed questions will be settled to the e~ 
tire satisfaction of both countries, and 
that nothing will be left to mar the inti-
mate and friendly relations that should ex-
ist between us.l5 
EAST JOINS WEST TO SUPPORT ARBITRATION 
The press of the east joined in approving the arbitration 
proposal. The Baltimore Sun expressed the conservative opinion 
that the whole proceeding "is in that rational spirit which 
should activate great and civilized nationstnl6 The New York 
Evening Post re-echoed hopes for a "successful arbitrationn.l7 
13 February 10, 1871. 
14 Ibid. Thumbnail sketches of the Commissioners occupied a 
Tuir column on the Journal's editorial page, February 13, 
1871. A sign of intense ln~erest. 
15 February 10, 1871. 
16 February 10, 1871. 
17 February 10, 1871. 
13 
The editor of the Philadelphia Public Ledger commented favorably 
on the proposal, and his analysis of the Fish-Thornton corre-
spondence was given to the public "as indicative of a quick 
settlement" •18 
It should be understood, however, that this pro-English and 
pro-arbitration sentiment was not universal. The New York press 
is a good illustration of this point. The D.aily lribune joined 
with the Evening Post, and both praised the "idea of the com-
mission", and express themselves as gratified with the "com-
missioners selectedn.l9 The Times which had previously lauded 
Reverdy Johnson's efforts as the work of an "astute lawyern20 
followed with wholesome praise of the Joint High Commission as 
a "peaceful mode for settling difficultiesn, 21 and for the Times 
editorial comment is surprisingly sanguine: 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
We are persuaded that their (the Joint 
High Co~~ission) ultimate decisions and 
agreements will be a new contribution to the 
practical side of International Law, and that 
their effect will be the most beneficent 
achievement of President Grant's administration. 22 
February 10, 1871. 
February lOi 1871. (See footnote 17). 
January 9, 871. 
February 13, 1871. 
Ibid. 
14 
But the New York World led press opposition to the very idea 
of arbitration. The paper's general antipathy to anything nun-
American" has been pointed out. 23 About mid-January the World 
carried editorials directed against the nuseless pleadings for 
Great Britain sponsored by the New York Times and other papersn.24 
A week later the "Alabama" question was still being editorial-
ized. An urgent appeal was made to "let Congress debate the 
cruisersn. 25 On the next day a list of suggested debaters ap-
pears in an editorial which urges the numerous benefits to be 
derived from o~en debate. Among the names mentioned were Sena-
tors Sumner and Butler "because of their extreme anti-British 
passion"; Carl Schurz who would speak "for the German interests"; 
Senator Casserly who is "trusted by the Irish Catholics"; and 
Senator Thurman because he is "lawlord of the Senaten.26 A 
spirited appeal is made to the effect that only Americans should 
settle the "Alabama" quarrel. 
• • • the fact is that as to the damages by 
the "Alabama", the people of this country will 
submit to nobody's arbitration. Great Britain 
must make due atonement. Let Con~7ess debate, 
--not the German, Dr. Bluntschle. 
23 See footnote 6, p. 10. 
24 January 17, 1871. 
25 January 25, 1871. 
26 January 26, 1871. 
27 January 31, 1871. See also Godkin's article, The Nation, 
October 6, 1870. 
15 
On the eve of the State Department's press release concern-
ing the nature of the Joint High Commission and the names of the 
Commissioners to be ratified, the Wor~ struck bitterly at the 
Evening~· Since the Post had published an editorial urging 
"friendship with Great Britainn28 above all else, the World, 
sharply critical of that position, called for "peace and justice 
first; we can get along without the friendship of Great Brit-
ainn.29 
Yet on the eventful day of the official government release 
which made the Joint Commission an actuality, the Worlq did an 
editorial somersault. In a lengthy leading editorial--"New 
Phases of the Alabama Negotiations"--the editor is all smiles: 
"Washington is the best spotn30 because our Senate ts in session 
and the people will be close by to protect their own interests. 
The previous appeal for open congressional debate is now modi-
fied to a plea for amiability: 
We would fain hope that Mr. Sumner prac-
tice forbearance; that Mr. Butler learn moder-
ation; that J. Q. Adams suppress his desire to 
fly at the throat of well dressed, well bred 
Englishmen. This new Alabama negotiation is 
to be started in the line of sound precedents, 
and in conformity with the precedent maxim 
that in many counsellors there is safety.31 
28 Quoted in the New York World, February 9, 1871. 
29 February 9, 1871. 
30 February 10, 1871. 
31 Ibid. 
16 
WAVE OF OPPOSITION TO JOINT HIGH COMMISSION 
Displeasure and suspicion were not missing among press re-
actions to the proposed Commission. The Philadelphia Inquirer 
dogmatically asserted that the "real meaning of England's propo-
sition is that she wants to settle the matter, and she wants to 
settle it on the cheapest terms • • ."; she is not being fair" 
••• and it is the business of our government to see she settles 
for all and pays the last penny duen.32 A week later the Phila-
delphia Ingui~~ still voiced her suspicions in a leading edi-
torial: "With 1v.hom is England Going to War?": 
Why all these military preparations, if all 
is satisfactory on the European front? We 
don't want war--but sooner or later, the 
Alabama claims must be paid.33 
Another Philadelphia paper, the Public Ledge~ tried to di-
vulge Britain's real motives for entering into an agreement with 
so much alacrity "as protection against 'American-built Alabamas' 
and as a bid for the friendship of a strong American.34 
When the news or the Commission was released, the New Eng-
land press did not content itself with mere felicitations. It 
32 February 10, 1871. This editorial seems to have 
an incomplete report of the official agreement. 
the paper supports the radical Sumner position. 
33 February 17, 1871. 
34 February 16, 1871. 
been based o 
In general 
probed much more deeply. The Springfield Reyubli~ openly 
stated: 
Lord Granville has proposed the Joint 
High Commission because he is unwilling to 
go before Parliament, where his foreign 
policy will be so sharply attacked, with-
out giving some assurance that the Alabama 
controversey is near its settlement.35 
17 
The Boston Advertiser couldn't refrain from observing that 
the proposed commission smacked very definitely of the Johnson-
Clarendon Convention. Sarcasm abounds in the following co~~ent: 
Since human reason is imperfect, it 
may not be sufficient to say that a thing 
is wrong because it is like the Johnson-
Clarendon Convention. But it is sufficient 
to say that in a popular government no 
statesman ought to force upon a people a 
scheme which affronts their keenest sensi-
bilities, and which, in a different form, 
has once been rejected ••• we believe the 
last treaty (Johnson-Clarendon Convention) 
was not only a mistake but a ttosi ti ve in-
sult. ~e don't believe thatreat Britain 
has abandoned her purpose.36 
Although the reactions for the most part were along inter-
national lines, yet the Springfield Reyublican raised the ques-
tion of domestic politics. If opposition to England will assure 
a Democratic victory in 1872, then oppos+tion to that "tyrant 
35 February 10, 1871. 
36 February 11, 1871. 
18 
England" will be headlined "on account of the great weight of the 
Irish element among its votersn. 37 The clamor for "strict just-
ice" on the part of the New York World38 is an example of just 
such a play for the Irish vote. 
Editorial readers of the New York Worlg were kept well in-
formed all during the month of February. One day the Fisheries 
question would come up for discussion;39 the next day public at-
tention would be directed to the "dogmatic stand of Montague 
Bernard", one of the British High Commissioners.40 "England has 
more skilled and professional advisers", solemnly pronounces the 
World. 41 Three days later Montague Bernard is on the editorial 
pan again--this time for "being a poor philosophern.42 On the 
Thursday before the Commission convened, Professor Bernard is 
taken to task: 
37 
38 
39 
,40 
41 
42 
43 
••• the Professor doesn't distinguish be-
tween the "intention to destroy" and actual 
destruction ••• the British Neutrality Law 
of 1870 contradicts his stand ••• u.s. 
Supreme Court decisions over-rule the Pro-
fessor • • • therefore, get to the question, 
Bernard.43 
Springfield ReEublican, February 10, 1871. 
See footnote 2 • 
February 14, 1871. 
February 17, 1871. Montague Bernard has an interesting book 
on English neutrality and we will refer to it later on in 
this paper. 
February 18, 1871. 
February 21, 1871. 
New York World, February 21 and 24, 1871. 
19 
Thi~ whole campaign on the part of the New York World 
against Montague Bernard is indirectly nullified in the pages of 
the keenly edited Springfield Hepublicao: 
Montague Bernard will find when he sits in 
on the Commission that last summer Parlia-
ment by modifying her foreign enlistment 
act--nullified over one half of his argu-
ment.44 
Press opinion was not unanimous in the belief that the 
World was setting up and knocking down straw-men in the "Alabama 
Claims" settlement. Late in March a leading editorial in the 
Nation scored the lack of public knowledge on foreign affairs. 
Faint, damning praise concludes the article: 
Indeed the New York World may be said to be 
the only paper which has made any serious 
attempt to form public opinion on it (i.e. 
on foreign affairs); and if its able dis-
cussions of questions of law and hermen-
eutics were not ~arred sometimes by blatant 
"chauvinism", and at other time~ by fer-
ocious party spirit, it would be entitled 
to the thanks of the community.45 
In some quarters the commission and the choice of commis-
sioners were touchstones for evaluating the Grant administration. 
The most rabid organ of the Democratic party immediately insti-
tuted a comparison between Grant and George Washington. Grant 
44 February 11, 1871. 
45 ·~Nation, March ~1, 187(~) (sic). 
20 
as "the man of the few half inch shreds of vapid commonplace ut-
terances" came off a bad second.46 Another member of the 
Knickerbocker press hailed Grant's action in the whole affair as 
nun-Americann.47 Grant, however, was not without his defenders. 
"His calm, practical view of the situation • • • is just another 
reflection of the President's practical statesmanship, and of 
his intuitive sense of right and justicen.48 Moreover the Balti-
more American was solemn in its pronouncement that "President 
Grant has been eminently successful in war and in peacen.49 ~ith 
a fling of extravagant praise Grant is credited with "finding the 
right men for the right place • • • of which the happy solution 
of the Alabama question is not the leastn.50 
PRESS RIDICULE 
Late February saw the sessions of the Joint High Commission 
get under way. One might speculate on what happened at those 
meetings between February 27 and May 8. If we had to rely upon 
46 New York Worl,S., April 26, 1871. 
47 New York Evening Post, March 10, 1871. This editorial re-
ferred to Sumner's removal as chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. 
48 Baltimore American, February 10, 1871 
49 February 10, 1871. 
50 Ibid. 
-
21 
press releases, we would starve for news. The doors were shut to 
the reporters and their despair is sharply outlined in the fol-
lowing humorous editorial: 
Sessions are private and the Commissioners ob-ject to being interviewed. Yet one thing we 
(Washington reporters) note:- the English com-
missioners have had a chance to indulge in 
some peculiar American luxuries. The de-
licious canvass-back duck, the savory Spanish 
mackeral, the tender terrapin, and the magni-
ficent oyster have played their parts in en-
deavoring to convince the Britishers that it 
would be injudicious to quarrel with the 
country that produces such luxuries.51 
The Baltimore .§!m seems to have jumped the gun in fun-
poking the High Co~missioners by tagging them as "The High 
Diners". 52 This wave of sa·rcasm was carried forward by the New 
York Herald: 
The Joint High Commissioners at Washington 
have discussed a good many .1,oints since they 
came together:- up to the present exactly 32 
deliberative dinners have been devoured. In 
evidence that eating has proved a powerful 
means to soften the head of a hatdshell dip-
lomat, the Herald adduces the examnle of Mr. 
Revardy Johnson.5c -
A week later an editorial, couched in somewhat the same 
taunting language, appeared in the Chicago Tribune.54 The 
51 Philadelphia Inquire~, April 11, 1871. 
52 April 4, 1871. 
53 New York Herald as cited in the Baltimore .§.qn, April 4, 1871. 
54 March 5, 1871. 
editors assured the public that "the Joint High Commission has 
co~~enced business in earnest" because the dinners were so sue-
cessful as to elicit frequent telegraphic mention from the Na-
tion's capitaln.55 In a spirit of reminiscing the Tribune 
readers were asked to recall that: 
Reverdy Johnson and Lothrop Motley had al-
ready devoted over 100 dinners each to the 
settlement of the Alabama claims; but in 
union there is strength and 10 High Com-
missioners all plying their knives and 
forks vigorously in concert, and bombard-
ing e~ch other across the table with cham-
pagne corks, can, of course, accomplish 
vastly more at a sitting than a minister 
ever so able, eating single handed against 
a score.56 
This bit of newspaper ridicule ends in a serious finale, quite 
exhortatory in tone: "Let the High Joint Gentlemen • • • be 
treated to the best in the larder. These ~otbersome w1estiona 
must be settled!" 
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From time immemorial mutual concessions have been the "bug-
bear" of every pre-treaty conference, and the sessions of the 
Joint High Commission proved no exception. The Boston Daily 
Advertiser57 reminded its readers of the favorably received 
Webster-Asburton Treaty, and was convinced that the same con-
ciliatory spirit permeates the American and British Commissioners. 
55 
56 
Ibid. 
-Ibid. 
It was stated that the sessions at Washington: 
show our state o~ civilization in yielding 
in the "non-substantial matters". It is to 
be hoped that we may emulate the sel~­
restraint o~ our ~athers, and in securing 
a not less successful issue out of even 
graver controversies.58 
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While the secret sessions carried on through March and 
April, a controversy raged in the papers on the question: Are 
the Americans over-matched on the Commission? It will be re-
called that the New York World vigorously maintained the affirma-
tive, and tenaciously held that "England has more skilled and 
professional advisersn.59 This stand on the relative inferiority 
of the American Commissioners evoked several sharp replies. The 
Chicago Tribune wisely pointed out that n • • • the American pub-
lic will not feel any misgivings on account of • • • our repre-
sentatives ••• (who) are tolerably sagacious, and sound in the 
qualifications required; viz: they know about how much ~want, 
and about how much we have got to have • • • n60 Two days later 
an even more vehement defense of our commissioners was voiced by 
still another Chicago organ: 
58 Ibid. 
59 February 18, 1871. See footnote 41, p. 18. 
60 March 2, 1871. 
• • • the very character of the American Com-
missioners is warranty enough against vacil-
lation on their part or power in that of the 
English gentl·emen to hoodwink or brow-beat 
them; ••• in equity and justice, let no man 
or journal be discourteous to them.61 
In the east the Boston Journal urged active support of our 
representatives on the Commission in the conviction that the 
"commissioners cannot very well go astray, since the public 
opinion of this country is so well matured".62 A very pointed 
comment appeared in the New York Evening Post, advising the ad-
ministration "to take a lesson from English appointed secre-
taries so that we appoint equally competent jurists and states-
menn.63 To the Boston Journal the whole question of the rela-
tive abilities of the Commissioners appeared as a npolitical 
footballn 
In this country there are politicians - and 
they may be confined to the Democratic party -
who do not want President Grant's administra-
tion to have the honor of bringing our con-
troversies with England to a complete and 
satisfactory settlement • • • Some want no 
settlement at all at present, preferring to 
have the existing irritation against England 
kept as a weapon admirable for electioneering 
purposes.64 
61 Chicago Evening Post, March 4, 1871. 
62 February 28, 1871. 
63 February 28, 1871. 
64 February 23, 1871. 
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During the Commission's sessions behind closed doors, the 
New York World grew caustic. The editors o~ this organ ~re­
quently o~~ered sage advice to the Britis~ representatives that 
"hal~way measures will be worse than nonen.65 "Popular ~eeling, 
and not merely the Irish voten66 should warn the Britishers that 
a thorough settlement o~ our di~~iculties is in good order. 
ANXIETY IN THE SOUTH AND MID-WEST 
Research shows that during the month o~ March anxious specu-
lation was rife in the South and in the mid-western states. In 
those regions ~un-poking the Commissioners did not appeal as a 
pastime. Rather from day to day serious re~lection and comment 
~ollowed upon the apparent lethargy o~ the Joint High Comnission. 
This serious spirit is well illustrated in a vindicative and 
pointed summary on the editorial pages of the Indianapolis News. 
It deals with the origin and the significance o~ the High Com-
mission. Some considered the propriety of "Canadian annexation" 
as compensation ~or our damages;67 others felt that "the 
Canadian claims ~or Fenian forays would offset our claims for the 
Alabama's workn.68 Undoubtedly this constant speculation bred 
pessimism: 
65 March 6, 1871. 
66 New York World, March 6, 1871. 
67 Indianapolis New~, March 9, 1871. 
68 Ibid • 
........... 
~-·------------------------------~ 
There is not, in short, any view of any part 
of the Commission's action that shows the 
light of probable adjustment without its ex-
act counterpart in shadow of as probable a 
failure.69 
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March dragged on. The Joint High Commission's apparent in-
activity did more than give birth to cynical rumblings about 
probable failure. A previous spirit of friendliness on the part 
of the Nation's press now gave wa~ to disgruntled fault-finding. 
An excellent example of this new and hostile spirit can be de-
tected in the editorial policy of the Indianapolis News. The 
London Times had published an editorial which fired the ~ 
with indignation. The English paper had boldly pronounced that: 
"England repudiates her responsibility for the depredations of 
the Alabama until it is declared by an impartial arbitern.70 
The Indianapolis News replied with this sharp rejoinder: 
Then, in the name of all that is idle and 
senseless, what is the Commission here for? 
If it has nothing to do until English re-
sponsibility is settled ••• it is of no 
more use here than a gang of the "swell 
mobn.71 
With justice does the editor of the News point out that the pres-
ent position of the Times (London) differs greatly from the stand 
taken in former discussions: 
69 Ibid. 
70 Loiidon Times as quoted by the Indianapolis News, March 9, 1871. 
71 Indianapolis ~' March 9, 1871. 
It (the Times) then saw and said plainly 
enough that if England disallowed her re-
sponsibility, the Alabama precedent would justify a like repudiation by the United 
States, and the first English war with a 
maritime ~ower would be the end of English 
commerce.72 
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Such editorial comment as just cited was, according to the 
American mind, merely the language of common sense or "logic 
working upon obvious factsn.73 In the eyes of a certain Indiana 
editor the stand taken by the London Times was tantamount to 
shading the glare of truth with a little national dignity, and 
such an attempt was distasteful to the American public: 
72 Ibid. 
73 rna. 
74 Ibid. 
It (England) thinks it "came down" a little 
too far and is climbing back. It is im-
pelled to take this course, we fancy, not a 
little by the helpless uneasy, awkward posi-
tion • • • in the recent war, and in the 
Black Sea Conference. The "right little, 
tight little island" that once gave the word 
to Europe has stood back as silent and lit-
tle considered as a "bound boy at a shocking". 
She has been pushed aside and she can neither 
remedy or resent the degradation. ~ the 
war is over, and fearing no complications in 
the East, the Times turns spitefully about 
now ~to dispose of that dirty little7affair of ours" (the Alabama controversey). 4 
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A kindred spirit was evidenced by the Indianapolis New~ dur-
ing the next two weeks.75 In a polite but firm warning England 
is asked to heed the fact that: 
She has set a ruinous precedent, and if she 
chooses to put difficulties in the way of a 
reversal of it, nobody will suff~r for it 
lOOth part as much as she will.76 
It must be understood that England and her Commissioners 
were not the sole objects of press attack and indignation. 
Several pointed remarks were directed against the "bad manage-
ment of President Grant and his antiquated premier, Mr. Fishn. 77 
Particular hostility towards the Government seemed to emanate 
from the state of Kentucky. Perhaps a lingering sympathy for 
the lost cause of the Confederacy accounted for newspaper at-
tacks on the Grant administration. The Louisville Daily Ledger 
boldly asserted that we had no moral basis for complaint against 
England, and that "it is only to propitiate the Irish vote that 
the government is raising this absurd question.n78 A strain of 
bitterness can be detected in one editorial which was calculated 
to justify the charge that the Joint High Commission was nothing 
but a mere play for the allegiance of Irish voters: 
75 On March 19 and 21 the editorials of the Indianapolis ~ 
reported that the English Commissioners were adopting the 
censorious tone first suggested by the London Times. 
76 Indianapolis ~' March 9, 1871. 
77 Louisville Dailz Ledger, March 14, 1871. 
78 Ibid. 
The natural attraction of the Irish people 
was to the South. The United States, how-
ever, won many of them with the promise 
that as soon as the South was "settled", 
England will be "pitched into", and Ire-
land's independence conquered; that they 
were to do for Ireland and the Irish, the 
very thing that they had gone to war to 
keep the South apd the Southern people 
from doing.79 
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More than once the readers of the Louisville Daily Ledger 
were advised to dismiss the work of the Joint Com·nission as 
"mere rowdy rhetoric" employed to "tickle the Irish hopesn. 80 
This same paper was scarcely ever inclined to endorse the Ameri-
can position on the "Alabama claims". One reason offered was: 
••• it is not in the nature of flesh and 
blood that the Southern people should 
stultify themselves by approving such 
claims, or by taking any interest in the 
SUCCeSS Of our Erms ar a senseless war 
growing out of them. 
During these same March days a more tolerant, and conse-
quently more rational outlook was that of the Chicago Tribune. 
Her editorials weighed carefully the possible disastrous conse-
quences in the event that the Joint High Co~rnission failed. The 
paper concluded that: 
79 IbiJ!. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Louisville Daily Ledger, March 14, 1871. Long editorial 
justification for the South's stand during the Civil War. 
• • • a new antagonism will grow up between 
the two governments and peoples; the stupid 
fisheries question will lead to collisions 
on the New England Coast; gold will go up 
and stocks (i.e. to say property) will go 
down, and all this without a particle of 
reason or common sense to justify it. If 
we escape war, it will only bS by good luck 
and the chapter of accidents. 2 
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Two days later the Washington corres9ondent of the Cincin-
nati Gazett~ reported that the business of the Commission was 
moving along in an easy and light vein;83 so light was the vein 
tha.t the Indiana.polis Dail;r Sentinel charged the account to the 
over-wrought imagination of the corres9ondent. The re})Ort, which 
purported to be a Morceau from the jou~nal of the British High 
Comrni.ssion, elicited this bit of press ridicule: 
Policy. Keep dark, lay low. Let the Ameri-
can Committee talk themselves hoarse. Beat 
. the devil around the bush. Time is no ob-ject. Be happy. Monday, March _, held 
usual session this morning. The cigars are 
not as good as usual, but the wine was very 
fine. Duration of session - 30 minutes. In 
the evening dined at Senator's • For 
America it was quite a creditable affair ••• 84 
The editorial concluded with a rapier-like thrust at the person 
of our Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish. "The good dinners and 
fine wines of the High Commission will suit Fish to a 'T'"·85 
82 Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1871.· 
83 Cincinnati Gazette as quoted in the Indianapolis Dail~ 
Sentinel, March 22, 1871. 
84 Indianapolis Dailz Sentinel, March 22, 1871 
85 Ibid. 
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On March 23, 1871, the Louisville Courier-Journal voiced its 
first comment on the work of the Joint High Commission. A lead-
ing editorial of two page-length columns was devoted to an 
"Interpretation" of the Commission's supreme inactivity.86 Com-
plete dissatisfaction was expressed at the failure of both sides 
of the Commission to produce or even suggest any kind of a 
settlement. Chief blame was placed upon English shoulders, and 
Great Britain was charged with a breach of faith. J. Henry 
Watterson, the colorful if not respected editor of the Courier-
Journal (Louisville), re-echoed in more vehement language the 
sentiments first expressed by the Indianapolis News (March 9, 
1871). The favorable change in European politics was set down 
as the fundamental cause for the present coldness and indiffer-
ence of the English members to the Joint High Commission: 
Two or three months ago it seemed as if 
England could not possibly get out of the 
Black Sea Controversey without a fight. 
She knew that it would be simule madness 
to go to war with Russia and leave the 
Alabama question open. Her commerce would 
have been swept from the seas. Therefore 
she conceived a sudden tenderness for us 
"republican rowdies" and her liberal press 
got off quite a display of sentimental fire-
works about the necessity of union and good 
fellowship between the8~ranches of the great free Anglo-Saxon race. 
86 Louisville Courier-Journa~, March 23, 1871. 
87 Ibid. 
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Prussia's intervention and desire for European peace pre-
vniled, 2nd war clouds were blown quickly away from English 
shores. With this fact in mind Watterson could write: 
England relieved of her quarrel with Rus-
sia • • • has had time to cool off and to 
remember that she does not love us as well 
as she thought two months ago.88 
A spirit of optimistic reaction followed close upon those 
events in European politics which caused England to look at the 
world once again through rose colored glesses. In this country 
the press did not appreciate the change. Mr. Disraeli and the 
English Nation were blasted as "stubborn" and this stubborness 
was re:ported to be the underlying cause of non-activity at Wash-
ington. The CouriE~r-Journal' s interpretation ends on a note of 
despair: "· •• we may expect something to be patched up that 
will do to put before the country by way of pretext and apology, 
but as for the brilliant diplomatic achievement expected of 
Secretary Fish, we are as yet unable to see itn.89 Fish was still 
playing the role of scape~goat two days later. This particular 
attack on Fish is somewhat repulsive and certair~y unwarranted: 
88 Ibid. 
• • • we report that a mere temporary and 
partial patching up of minor details is 
the largest measure of success that we 
anticipate from Mr. Fish's wine hibbing 
and gluttonous diplomacy.90 
89 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 23, 1871. 
90 Louisville Courier-Journal March 25 1871. 
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As March moved into April the indifferent and sometimes 
hostile Indianapolis ~ proclaimed the whole attempt at settle-
ment "a wasted mission", and maintained that the Commission "was 
coming out the same hole it went inn.91 Since this was the case, 
the Administration at Washington was given the fatherly advice 
to be "silent and indifferent" to the final outcome, lest the 
American people be treated to another "pudding and port treaty" 
like that of Mr. Reverdy Johnson. 
The apparent dead-lock at Washington persisted. Continued 
charges of infidelity were levelled against England by the 
Courier-Journal.92 "Smug complacency" best describes the atti-
tude of one Indiana Daily: "It is not our 'funeral•. If England 
wants the rule of the Alabama precedent retained, it's her affair. 
It won't hurt us to leave it as it isn.93 
The press seemed drugged with disappointment as the first 
week of April dragged by without any new developments. The on:.y 
bit of enthusiasm came from the Louisville Dailz Ledge~, but it 
was an enthusiasm shot tl1rough with satire: 
91 March 28, 1871. 
92 Louisville Courier-Journal, April 1, 1871. 
93 Indianapolis ~' March 28, 1871. 
~~· ----------------~~ 
The Joint High Commission must be in a fair 
way to settlement; at least the Co~~issioners 
are in good humour; and as long as you can 
keep Englishmen in good humor - • • • (She is 
set) for any bargain ••• only if Oxford 
co~d row over and beat Harvard - then we 
would win our claim$.~4 
FOffi~AL DRAFTING OF THE TREATY 
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Then carne the break. On April 8 the Joint High Commission 
took up the formal drafting of the treaty.95 On the eve of that 
happy day a special Washington correspondent scooped the country 
with his telegraphic report that "the settlement would in no way 
compromise our national honor, and it would be satisfactory to 
the American peoplen.96 This same good news of real activity in 
Washington was considered by the Chicago Evening Post as "an 
argument for liberal government". Editorial readers were en-
lightened to the effect that: 
England's derelection ••• arose before the 
triumph of liberalism; when Gladstone and 
Bright and their coadjutors, in the 2~use of 
progress, were in the minority ••• 
Now all is changed and great men (viz. Gladstone and Bright) are 
"making haste slowlyn.98 Another Chicago paper, long silent on 
94 April 6, 1871. 
95 Protocols quoted by Nevins, Hamilton ELan, 488. 
96 Indianapolis Journal, April 7, 1871. 
97 April 10, 1871. 
98 ~-
~------------------~ 35 
the Alaba:·rra question, congratulated the country on the satisfac-
tory progress made by the Joint High Commission: 
It will be a precedent that is to be hoped 
will be followed in the future, in the set-
tlement of national disputes and differ-
ences.99 
When the High Commission ha.d been working on the formal 
draft of the treaty for almost a week, one New York paper was in-
clined to look favorably on the previous month's work and claimed 
that the joint body accomplished "as much as could be expected 
of themn.lOO To the independent Indianapolis ~' however, the 
announcement of formal draft proceedings meant little. The edi-
tor was quite suspicious of latent int;rigue, and in order to make 
light of this report and all previous inactivity he spun this 
little yarn: 
Then we heard from him (the story is about 
the fate of a man who went to sea) and then 
we didn't; and then we did and then we 
didn't; and then we did and at last we 
didn't.lOl 
It was maintainPd that so many stories and conflicting reoorts on 
the urogress of the treaty had the "sea-going yarn" beat by a 
mile. Consequently the Indianapolis ~ was content to remain 
vague.102 
99 Chicago Evening ~, April 11, 1871. 
100 New York Herald, April 15, 1871. 
101 Indianapolis News, April 14, 1871. 
102 Indianapolis ~~ April 24, 1871. 
~----------------~ 
Even when the Commissioners began work in earnest, the New 
York Herald seemed still to be haunted by the memory of the 
nJohnsonian antics" in England during 1869-1870. At any rate 
the Co'!IlJtiissioners etre to be "excused" because: 
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they had so much extra labor in the way of 
fox hunting, starting documentary evidence 
from cover, dining, flushfff~ old precedents, 
visiting and merrymaking. u 
It is no secret that the British members to the Commission 
were annoyed every time an Irish partisan paper "twisted the 
Lion's tail". They were particularly vexed by the actions of 
Senator Butler who was so quick to pick up and carry forward the 
Irish torch. Even in this country the Senator's activity was 
severely criticized. The Philadelphia Inouirer sharply rebuked 
Butler "for striving so hard to ingrati[tte himself with the 
Irish voters by demanding that the "Alabama" commissio~ insist 
on the claims of American citizens in British dungeonsn.l04 
Toward the end of April the New York World reviewed most 
sympathetically the work of the Commissicn.l05 In the same con-
ciliatory stra~in the Philadelphia Inquirer conceded that nothing 
103 New York Herald, Aoril 15, 1871. 
104 April 19, 1871. 
105 April 24, 1871. 
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can be dearer than "a peace purchased by mutual concessions and 
just principlesn.l06 Like sentiments were voiced by the Chicago 
,gyening £2.§1.107 Yet one day later a strong proof of the 
democracy of our press is found, for, when most of the leading 
journals were chanting the praises of "work well done", the New 
York Herald sharply scores the inadequacy of the Joint High Com-
mission: 
No Alabama money is forthcoming; no Yan.kee 
fishermen are to trim their sails for sum-
mer cod in Canadian waters, no western 
steamers are to be unhindered from Chicago 
to the sea through Canadian channels • • • 
until the Commissioners finish their "la-
bors" -- even then stormy discussions will 
follow.l08 
106 April 24, 1871. 
107 April 27, 1871. 
108 April 25, 1871. 
~-· --------------~ 
CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC OPINION CRYSTALLIZES, MAY, 1871 
May 1871 witnessed the gradual crystallization of .American 
public opinion on the Joint High Commission. Almost daily did 
the proposed treaty come in for comment on the edi tori~.l pages 
of the country's leading journals. Between May 2 and May 8 
speculation was a favorite press hobby. On the 8th of May the 
treaty was completed and signed. Interest grew by leaps and 
bounds when President Grant summoned the Senate to meet in spe-
cial session on May lOth. Two weeks ele.psed before the Treaty 
was fina.lly ratified on May 24th. During this fourteen day 
period the newspapers vied in featuring any and all kinds of 
treaty chatter. The importance and notice taken of even the 
sma.llest incidents revealed the feeling on both sides of the 
Atlantic that the treaty was an event of cardinal significance. 
While the Commission was actually completing the treaty 
draft, the press could not remain silent. The New York World 
made a bla!"l..ket proposal to debate the treaty in open Senate re-
gardless of precedent. 1 If the Senate should meet to discuss 
1 May 2, 1871. 
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and pass on the treaty in executive session, then at least a copy 
0 
of the document should be given simultaneously to the press.~ 
One exhortation followed another, and there was a constant plea 
to consider first and foremost the people's interest. The motion 
for open debate in the Senate was seconded by the Springfield 
Republican: "All we urge is public approbation by open debaten.3 
In order to avoid another Johnson-Clarendon fiasco, "public judg-
ment on the m~tter was deemed necessaryn. 4 A new voice was heard 
in praise of the commission's work, when the New York Herald, for 
the first time, looked upon the Joint Commission's endeavors as 
"fair and honorable to both sides"; moreover the treaty as sub-
mitted was said to contain "humanitari~n benefits to one and all" 
TEMPERS FLARE 
The days just before the final draft was signed were a 
period of grave suspense in both countries. Under the strain of 
expectancy, it is not surprising that tempers flared and feeling 
became tense. Here at home the New York Tribune urged its pub-
lic to ignore "the inventions of special correspondents" who are 
not in the "known and "who can't penetrate the secrets of the 
2 Ibid. 
3 May 2, 1871. 
4 Ibid. 
5 May 4, 1871. 
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closeted commissionersn.6 This advice was eminently sane, but 
unfortunr,tely it came too late to avoid a near catastrophe. For 
on the very day that the Tribune issued her editorial against 
belier in vague rumors, the Boston Daily Advertiser carried a 
leading editorial entitled: "Press Oninion on the Approaching 
Settlement". In dramatic fashion the New England organ played 
up "the nervous anxiety and not unbroken amiability of the Eng-
lish press in discussing the supposed doings of the Joint High 
Commissionn.7 The very thing that the Tribune had warned 
against, had happened. "Rumors regarded in the United States as 
too vague to merit much consideration, in England have become the 
basis for articles evidently emanating from writers of no com-
fortable fra.me of mind". 8 This editorial concluded most force-
fully with a spirited appeal to avoid "slinging mud on national 
characters". 
Unfortunately the appeal went unheeded. Despite the fact 
that a majority of the reliable papers pursued a prudent course 
during these days tense with uncertainty, the ugly head of bit-
ter ridicule was reared. The innuendo of an editorial which bore 
the alluring title of "Getting out of the Woods", is apparent in 
the following quotation: 
6 
7 
8 
May 5, 1871. Mar 5, 1871. 
lJl...s!. 
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It is not at all certain that the Joint High 
Commission has got near enough to the "edge 
of the woods" to justify even the little 
"whistling-" it is said to indulge in, but it 
is certain that the popular reports regard-
ing its action are flying in a narrower cir-
cle and in a steadier line, and leaves the 
impression like the narrowing flight of a 
flock of buzzards, that there is a real car-
cass somewhere in the circumference. We are 
not too sanguine:- It ~.rould be very much 
like the English to want to confuse the ras-
cally character of the whole affair.9 
Quite naturally such a slur on the intentions of Great Brit-
ain did not sit well with the English press. Add to this factor 
another item which agitated their press no end. Were the new 
rules of neutrality to be retroactive or not? This was a most 
delicate point, and according to English public opinion: 
to give a new rule a retroactive effect would 
be monstrous; to hold England to answer for 
infractions of a rule which were committed 
years before the rule exi~ted, would be ab-
surd.l0 · 
The retort snapped back by the Boston paper was to the 
point. They conceded the English logic to be superfici;;.lly good, 
but they contended that "the axiom of equity expressed in the 
homely saying that 'one cannot eat his cake and have it too' lies 
much deeper in the settlement of the 'Alabama claims'n.11 
9 India.napo1is News, May 5, 1871. 
10 Quoted in the Boston Daily Advertiser, May 5, 1871 
11 Boston Dailz Advertiser, May 5, 1871. 
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American public sentiment on this point was further clarified by 
the same Boston Daily Advertiser: 
Even gamester's honor condemns the greedi-
ness of which England is tempted to be guilty, 
and requires him who h~s won by a run of good 
luck to offer to his adversary an opportunity 
to win back his losses before crying quite for-
ever; ••• everlasting justice and honor are 
not the creatures of diplomacy and negotiation. 
What was right and wrong in 1870, was also 
right and wrong in 1860. We are not waiting 
for an emnty formulan.l2 
Before the draft of the treaty was released, the Charleston 
Courier playfully t8.gged this period as one of "political fire-
works". The whole idea of the commission was characterized as 
mere "political strategy" ,of the party then in power. "Once 
Grant was elected", the paper observed, "A High Commission is ap-
pointedn.l3 The previous rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon Con-
vention was considered not so much a mistake as "an election 
trick pure and simplen.l4 
FINAL TREATY DRAFT SIGNED 
Then dawned 1.fay 8, 1871, a red-letter day in the Nation's 
12 Ibid. 
13 Charleston (s.c.) Courier, May 4, 1871. 
14 Ibid. As other rabid democratic organs the Charleston 
Courier considered the work of the Joint High Commission as 
a complete vindication of the former efforts of Reverdy 
Johnson. 
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canital. It was the day on which the final draft of the Washing-
ton Treaty was signed by the Joint High Commissioners. The New 
York Herald "scooped" the official announcement. Tba~ks to the 
report of a special correspondent, this organ featured an edi-
torial that was most congratulatory in tone.l5 Writing as the 
special correspondent for the Boston Journal, the widely known 
Ben Perley praised the treaty as "acceptable to the majority of 
the people of this countryn.l6 
Under date of May 9th many of leading papers carried edi-
torials in praise of the treaty, precisely as drafted and signed 
by the Joint High Commissioners. The New York press led the way. 
The most lavish epithets were furnished by the New York Herald 
which regarded the treaty "as one of the most interesting and im-
portant political events of the 19th centuryn.l7 The editors 
felt confident: 
that the enlightened and peace-loving people 
of this great republic will accept this 
treaty with something of the faith of St. 
Paul, that is, as "the substance of things 
hoped for, and the evidence of things not 
seen ••• nl8 
15 May a, 1871. 
16 May 8, 1871. 
17 May 9, 1871. 
18 Ibid. 
-
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Still more plaudits came to the High Commission. It was heralded 
as "an important landmark to the historian" and "the opening of a 
new chapter in a new and higher order of international re-
ciprocities and obligations". Amid highly laudatory statements 
we find stress on a very sober and realistic obs~rvation: "the 
greatest concession is that of the paramount necessity to England 
of peace and of the manifest obligations of peace to ourselves 
and to the world at largen.l9 
Nor was the New York World to be outdone by her Gotham ri-
vals. A three column editorial hailed the treaty as an equitable 
settlement. By far the larger portion of this lengthy editorial 
was devoted to a serious consideration of how the United States 
Senate should react to the proposal. Strong emphasis was placed 
upon the terrible consequences that would follow, should the 
treaty be rejected. 20 With an eye on the 1872 presidential elec-
tion, the editor pointed out that rejection of the treaty "means 
w~r or humiliation". Then follows a most interesting analysis 
which illustrates the possible political consequences of a re-
jected treaty and suggests serious reasons why Grant should de-
sire a rejection: 
19 Ibid. 
20 May 9, 1871. 
The credit General Grant may get for set-
tling this controversey (which really belongs 
to his Secretary of State) will count for 
nothing as an electioneering influence, in 
comparison with the advantage he would possess 
by the co~~and of several thousand soldiers 
and a revival of the old cry that opposition 
to the President is disloyalty to the country. 
~ kDQn ~ 1i wa~ under LipcoJp, and desire 
no similar state of things under Grant, who 
has more decision of character and less of in-
tellect, and could plead the Lincoln prece-
dents in justifying him in suppressing news-
papers, imprisoning citizens, shutting up the 
courts of justice, and causing the tinkle of 
Mr. Seward's bell to be heard all over the 
Island. l.t ,a ~reat m ill .t.b.e. hands .o.t: 
Lincoln xu A scourge Q!. ;eb:f ps, a. ire at ~ 
in ~ ba_nd_s .Q! Grant wouJ g lle. a. scourge .o.t: 
scorpio~ 
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The New York Evening Post acclaimed the treaty "as work well 
done" and insisted that "honor, not money held up previous nego-
tiat1onsn.22 A like attitude was adopted by the New York Tribune 
which added the hope that "the treaty be considered solely upon 
its merits, without the slightest admixture of any feeling or 
prejudicen.23 
The salvos of general praise were continued by the Spring-
field Republican which looked upon the document prepared by the 
High Commission "as a strong guarantee of propriety and popu-
larityn.24 
21 New York World, May 9, 1871. Underscoring added. 
22 May 9, 1871. 
23 May 9, 1871. 
24 May 9, 1871. 
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There were, however, two papers which did not immediately join 
the chorus of "all-out" treaty editorials. The Philadelphia ln-
~uirer looked upon the whole affair "as a great mysteryn, 25 and 
urged further delay. The Baltimore American contented itself 
with a mere general analysis of the proposed treaty and added tre 
ominous inference that "Great Britain is liable for all the dam-
ages that Sumner said she was, to wit, $110,000,000 plus inter-
estn.26 
When the papers of May 10 and 11 had rolled off the press, 
there was an even more universal approval of the work of the 
Joint High Commission. So enthused was the New York World that 
she now called herself "the mother of the treaty ab QYQn,27 and 
in her new maternal role she carped at the New York Tribune 
which accepted the treaty with "feeble and halting praisen.28 
The World was also under the impression that the New York Times 
was giving "the treaty the cold shouldern.29 
Simultaneously other eastern sea-board journals were march-
ing into the pro-treaty camp. The Boston Advertiser was 
25 May 9, 1871. 
26 May 9, 18~1. 
27 May 10, 1871. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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definitely only modest in its praise because the editor conr-
sidered this editorial his "first and rough crit1cism•.30 The 
Baltimore Sun appealed to the Senate that this body "continue the 
same high level of statesmanshipn31 that characterized the cour-
ageous High Commissioners. An exhortation to swift ratification 
was also put on ·record by the Chicago Tribune: 
" • • 
• the peace 
and harmony of civilized nations are too important to permit such 
a suitable and comprehensive adjustment of national questions to 
be defeatedn.32 A sister paper from the Chicago area also ap-
proved the treaty, but for local and seemingly less altruistic 
reasons. The key note of this editorial was the provision of the 
treaty which stipulated free navigation of the St. Lawrence: 
by which Chicago (by virt11e of a steamer-
line between Chicago and Montreal) will be 
made the greatest recept~cle and distribu-
ting point for imported goods from Europe 
for the West, thus saving the expense and 
delay of the New York custom and bonded 
houses.33 
The Chicago Evening Post felt that the prevailing general desire 
to "dispose of the case" made the ratification of the Washington 
Treaty only a matter of days.34 
30 May 10, 1871. 
31 May 10, 1871. 
32 May 10, 1871. 
33 Chicago Ev~ning Ma~~' May 11, 1871. 
~4 May 11, 1871. 
The New York Herald, previously censured by the New York 
World, finally came into the pro-treaty camp, but by the back 
-
door. It proposed a doubt: 
There is one feature of the treaty on 
which there seems a doubt •.•• the British 
agree that a rule cannot be made retroactive 
because the Commission would in fact be 
"applying to an international offence that 
which is considered in municipal legislation 
the height of injustice" - an ~ ROS~ facto 
or retroactive law~35 
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Otherwise the treaty was acceptable. Of course from the American 
point of view, the "ex post facto" element in the treaty was of 
cardinal importance. The facts of the case were put quite blunt-
ly by the Indianapolis ~: 
• • • there was no law when the Alabama got 
away, but Her Majesty is willing to act as 
if there had been one. She did not do 
wrong but she is willing to pay. No body 
will object to the protest of innocence so 
long as the payment is the confession of 
guilt.36 
Then with a cruel thrust of cold logic the editor concluded his 
remarks by saying: "Allowing an ~ .!2.!2.§!. facto operation to a 
rule which makes a debt of a good many millions of dollars, is 
about as satisfactory an a~~ission of original transgression as 
we wantn.37 It should be reiterated that a refusal on Britain's 
part to adopt retroactive rules would have allowed her "to eat 
her cake and have it too". 
10, 1871. 
12, 1871. 
~ 
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The conservative Philadelphia Public Ledger had high praise 
for the Commission's accomplishment. The editorial tribute was 
couched in language befitting a Quaker: 
the treaty will establish as part of public 
law that which will put an end to several 
very serious disputes between England and 
America, that have for several years marred 
the "good will" which it is the desire of 
the great portion of the peoule to bear 
towards all their neighbors~58 
"WATCHFUL WAITING" 
On the lOth of May the Philadelphia Inquirer proposed to 
continue her policy of "watchful waiting". This journal took its 
stand in accordance with the line of thought of the Boston Adve~­
tiser,39 namely, a lack of faith in the "loose, irresponsible 
rumors sent flying through the country by Washington correspond-
ents, who, in the absence of real information, drew on their im-
aginationn.40 The 11th of May saw a partial change in the "say-
nothing" campaign of this organ. At least a favorable reception 
of the treaty was noted. But the temporary approval carried with 
it a "rider". What if Great Britain should show equal favor and 
all our difficulties should come to an early conclusion? The 
answer to this question was a perfect springboard for further 
Grant propaganda: 
38 May 11, 1871. 
39 Cohfer footnote 8 of this chapter. 
40 May 10, 1871. 
'I 
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President Grant would have reason to feel 
that he had done as much to entitle himself 
to the gratitude of his fellow-citizens in 
a civil office as he formerly did in a mil-
itary one.41 
As the Senate debated the treaty in executive session, the 
press continued its editorial comments. Due to the fact that the 
Committee on Foreign affairs held their sessions in secret, the 
newspapers were forced either to rehash the text of the treaty or 
to speculate on what might be taking place behind closed doors. 
In the belief that undue speculation might be too dangerous, a 
majority of the leading journals chose to reconsider and re-
appraise the treaty as it came from the hands of the High Commis-
sion. The New York Times felt quite keenly that "the principle 
of arbitration could not possibly be more fairly, thoroughly, or 
wisely applied to practical affairs than in this new treatyn.42 
This same paper was convinced that England "is coming more than 
half way to meet us on the ground of reason and justicen.43 The 
Boston Advertiser emphatically declared that "the text of the 
treaty justifies the hopeful coloring given by the State Depart-
ment to the briAf summary sent out as a kind of 'avant courier' 
for the opinions of the people.n44 The Chicago Tribune 
41 Philadelphia Inquirer, May 11, 1871. 
42 May 12, 1871. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ~2, 1871. 
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laconically observed "the Joint High Com~ission has done all we 
could rationally expectn.45 
The Indianapolis Journal sincerely asked its readers to 
scrutinize the text of the treaty so that "they form an intelli-
gent opinion for themselves as to what the honor and dignity and 
interest of the United States demanded from their Senatorsn.46 
Praise for every party concerned seemed to be the policy of the 
New York Herald on May 12th: "Peace loving Queen Victoria and 
our honest soldier President" have achieved "a great and glorious 
work~.47 Scarcely more vigorous praise coald have been given 
than the encomium which appeared in the pages of the Chicago 
Evening Post: 
The treaty, from the first to the last, gives 
evidence of great industry and vigilance on 
both sides, and of an ingenuousness and fair-
mindedness • • • It is a tribute to the hon-
esty and candor of the Commissioners, and if 
executed in the spirit in which it is drawn, 
will not only stand as a monument of the 
quiet wisdom of this Republican administra-
tion, but also as an evidence that every in-
ternational quarrel could be cheaply and justly settled by arbitration.48 
45 May 12, 187,1. 
46 May 12, 1871. 
47 New York Times, May 12, 1871. 
48 May 12, 1871. 
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Within the next twenty-four hours, and for no apparent or 
tangible reason, the Indianapolis News made a partial recantation 
of her stand on the treaty. Her unstinted praise was now con-
ditioned by the feeling that the treaty: 
••• will be ratified but with some such 
feeling as Sheridan expressed at the con-
clusion of the treaty of Amiens: "it is 
something of which everybody may be glad 
but nobody may be proudn.49 
The Evening Post (New York) proclaimed in a most sweeping 
manner that: 
the utter futility of ••• even the most 
plausible objections that have been dis-
covered to this treaty, only shows that 
the nearl_y unanimous :rL1.ah .a!. .the. people 
of the country accords with the true pol-
icy of the government and that the treaty 
as a whole • • • cannot be too promptly 
or too cordially ratified.so 
There was another press dispute on the island of Manhattan 
that merits our attention. The New York Irib~ did not see eye 
to eye with her sister paper, the New York Times; their dis-
agreement centered about England's motive for settling all the 
difficulties involved. The Times had alleged most forcefully 
that England's purpose was "to prevent the recurrence of in-
jurious errorsn,51 and for this reason did she concede her whole 
49 Indianapolis News, May 13, 1871. 
50 May 12, 1871. 
51 New York Tribune, May 12, 1871. 
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case by admitting retroactive rules under which she was to be 
held responsible. Capitalizing on this particular claim that ex-
pediency was Britain's chief motive, the Tribune sought to make 
light of the Times' editorial wherein England was hailed as a 
champion of justice. 52 Strange as it may seem, the New York 
Tribune, despite its dig at English expediency, turned around and 
approved the treaty "as work done with a most serious and im-
pressive spiritn.53 On one and the same day the rival editors 
appeared to be carrying water on both shoulders. 
During this period of our country's history Samuel Bowles 
was the nationally known editor of the Springfield Renublican.54 
For old fashioned, conservative estimates of public policy the 
Nation turned to the editorials featured by the Republican. On 
May 12th editor Bowles was at his very best: 
There is abundant reason to dislike 
the treaty, if anybody really wants to, as 
there is still more abounding occasion for 
approving, if that be our disposition. 
But the general wish in both countries is 
to accept the treaty. 
Mr. Sumner seems ready to criticize. 
We may look for something of this sort from 
the Democratic senators too • • • yet we 
are sure that the greater part of the Ameri-
can people prefer it unamended to failure ••• 
52 May 12, 1871. See footnote 43, p. 40. 
53 May 12, 1871. 
54 For interesting details see Merriam, The Life Q! Samuel 
Bowles. 
The treaty reduces or promises to reduce the 
points o~ di~ference and the area o~ ill-
~eeling, and will make it much more di~~i­
cult hence~orth ~or Irish prejudice and po-
litical ambitions to involve the two nations 
in serious trouble.55 
A STORM OF OPPOSITION 
54 
It is not to be thought that the treaty enjoyed only smooth 
sailing in a calm ~~erican press; quite the contrary was true. 
Black storm clouds, heavy with strong criticism against the 
treaty, threatened. The Charleston Courier ranked high as a bit-
ter assailant of the treaty. In a leading editorial, most criti-
cal in tone, the Courier quoted a large excerpt ~rom the Wash-
ington (D.C.) Patriot. Needless to say both were rabid Demo-
cratic organs. In order to give a balanced view o~ press 
opinion it will be pro~itable to quote the ~inal paragraph o~ an 
editorial so adverse to the treaty: 
On the whole the treaty is a disgrace to the 
powers that be, not because it is not just 
and right, but because it is a declaration 
to the world that they rejected better terms 
when o~fered some years ago, for the reason 
that they loved then, as they do now, place 
and power ~ar more than they do the inter-
ests o~ the American people. Whether the 
Senate affirms or rejects the treaty one 
thing is certainly established, and that is 
55 Spring~ield Republican, May 12, 1871. 
the fact that the administration of General 
Grant will, without regard to fixed princi-
ples, accept or reject any policy which may 
at the moment seem to offer success to the 
radical party.56 
Still more vigorous opposition came from the Louisville 
Daily Ledger. In a burst of rhetoric and blind passion fed by 
55 
smoldering sectional r~tred, the paper went on record as saying: 
• • • if the Senate does ratify the treaty 
they will stultify themselves. The feeling 
was so strong against Johnson's treaty ••• 
(that there) was one vote short of unani-
mous rejection. Only Mr. McCreery of this 
state voted for it ••• The Washington 
treaty embodies the same principles as the 
Johnson-Clarendon treaty ••• ~ ~ give 
in 1£ sectionalism? • • • the whole thing 
stinks of cod-fish, now that New England is 
running the Government.57 
As might be supposed, these partisan pleas to ridicule, and 
thus defeat the treaty,. met with bitter counter-attacks. Per-
haps the most vehement re:oly was that of the Chicago Eyening Post,. 
Without reserve this organ struck out against nthe more notorious 
Democratic papers who are urging their senators to 'vote in a 
body against the treatytn.58 Opposition of such a cheap politi-
cal nature was felt to be most unfair. If the States were really 
nunitedn, then in patriotic matters they should act in concert: 
56 May 12, 1871. 
57 May 10, 1871. 
58 Chicago Evening ~~ May 15, 1871. 
What there is or can be of a political nature, 
or what party capital can 9e made out of an 
opposition to this measure would be difficult 
to surmise. It is either a fair or upright 
compact, honorable alike to both sides, and 
mutuaT: .. y ber ..eficial, o~9it ought to be re-jected by every party.o 
This same organ adopted as its editorial motto: "Beware of 
Chronic Partisanship".60 
56 
Day by day press comment paralleled Senatorial debate. The 
Philadelphia Public Ledger continued to urge ratification in "a 
spirit of brotherly loven.61 The keynote sounded by the New York 
Times wa~ to augment "the great code of justice and humanityn~2 
This would be accomplished if both sides would accept the "due 
diligence" clauses without amendment. 
At this juncture the Philadelphia Inauirer urged people to 
deluge the members of the Committee an Foreign Affairs with tele-
grams and letters so that these senators would know the public 
mind. The editor couched his advice in the following way: 
• • • in fact the whole business belongs to 
the people • • • the wisest lavcyer is. cap-
able of receiving the most valuable sug-
gestions from his clients, and so is a Sen-
ator from r~s constituents.63 
59 Chicago Evening ~' May 15, 1871. 
60 Ibid. 
61 May 13, 1871. 
62 May 13, 1871. 
63 Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1871. 
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At the close of the first week of secret Senatorial debate 
and lavish press com1nent, the Springfield Republican was con-
vinced that Wthe American press apnrove the treaty both in spirit 
and detail, with very few exceptionsn. 64 The phrase "few excep-
tions" provided the editor with an opportunity to attack the stan 
taken by the chief rebels, the Washington Patriot, the Charleston 
Courier, and the Louisville Daily Ledger. To show the conspicu-
ously one sided character of the minority opposition the text of 
the Patriot's edi torie.l is cited in part by the Springfield ~­
publican: 
Great Britain's regrets are the cheapest and 
the smallest form of her acknowledgment of 
her wrongs to us, vrhile the new rules of in-
ternational law are old sta.gers dressed up 
by Mr. Bernc.rd, costumer to the Commission, 
and familiar to everybody but American nov-
ices • • • In all the history of our diplo-
macy, there never before has been so abject 
and so humiliating a surrender of national 
honor, or abandonment of previous principles 
as in this miserable agreement.65 
On the same day the Indianapolis Journal joined forces with the 
Springfield Republican. Together they censured the "captious 
criticism" of the treaty, and pleaded for fair, careful sena-
torial consideration.66 
64 
65 
It is of more than passing interest to note some of the par-
58 
ticular reservations which accompanied the general praise given 
to the treaty. Local politics and local commercia.l interests ex-
ercised their own telling influence on editorial policy and com-
ment. The underlying prejudice• of such papers as the New York 
World, the Charleston Courier and the Washington Patriot have al-
ready been mentioned. It can be stated here that such unreason-
able devotion to a political party was stigmatized by the Chicago 
Tribune as "pure demagogismn.67 
One further illustration of how local interest affected the 
reception of the treaty will serve to good purpose. It is the 
deep concern O""~rer the "Fisheries" evidenced in the New England 
:press. The Boston Daily Advertiser, whi·le bestowing lavish 
praise on the document prepared by the Joint High Commission, 
nevertheless held out a trump card against immediate ratification 
without amendment: 
It is well to look this matter fairly in the 
face, and to know what we are doing. It may 
be that on the vrhole it is best for the na-
tion at l&rge to pursue precisely the course 
which the treaty marks out. But let us at 
least see and understand whither that course 
leads.68 
The subsequent trend of the editorial is doubtlessly influenced 
by the spectre of bankrupt New England fishermen idly hugging the 
shore: 
67 May 18, 1871. 
68 May 17, 1871~ 
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It may be that the u.s. does well to pay this 
high price, but let the people know at,least 
that they are paying it. Let us not awake by-
and-by to a tardy repentance. The blow to a 
great branch of national industry is a heavy 
one, and ought not to be dealt, if it can be 
reasonably avoided. If it cannot, then it 
must fall; the fisheries must yield to the in-
evitable, and the part must suffer for the 
whole • • • (so that) the matter be in the 
best possible shape. So great a price is not 
to be paid for an equivalent of doubtful val-
ue, or for benefits which could be purchased 
at less a cost in any other way.69 
On the other hand it was the considered opinion of the Chicago 
Evening Mail that the treaty should be ratified: 
••• notwithstanding the objections of the 
mackeral fishermen of New England. The Gov-
ernment of Great Britain will do the same 
thing, just as regardless of the objections 
of the people of N8va Scotia, New Brunswick, 
or New Foundland.7 
59 
On May 18, 1871 The Nation, a weekly, edited by E.L. Godkin, 
carried a fine editorial on the treaty as it was before the Sen-
ate. It is of importance to note that James Bryce considered the 
Nation "the best weekly not only in AmPrica but in the worldn.71 
69 Ibid. 
70 May 20, 1871. 
71 R. Ogden, Dictionary Q! American Siographx, v. 7 pp. 350, the 
article on E.L. Godkin. For a more comnlete account see 
Godkin's Life by the same author, Rollo.Ogden. It is also of 
some significance to know that Godkin was British-born and 
sympathetic to British interests. 
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Whether such extravagant praise was justified is not the question 
now. However, we do know on good authority that this periodical 
commended itself to an intelligent reading public by its range of 
scholarship, breadth of view and high moral tone. 72 Consequently 
any statement on the treaty ~ould have great weight - where weigh 
and influence counted most. The tone of the article was defi-
nitely favorable: 
In signir~ this treaty Great Britain has vir-
tually said: mwe were wrong". But further-
more, the adoption of the doctrines and rules 
of international law which this convention 
contains - doctrines for which the United 
States had contended from the first - makes a 
decision by the arbitrators in our favor ab-
solutely certain.73 
A similar opinion was confirmed by the New York World which 
considered "the new rules of law with their retroactive operation 
as the soul of the treatyn.74 "Sane ratification" was also urged 
on the same grounds by the New York Evening ~.75 These new 
rules and "their certain effect" were also discussed editorially 
by the New York Herald. First the organ suavely lauds the "pa-
triotic and conciliatory spirit which governed both sides of the 
Commissionn.76 Then sympathetic understanding is offered to 
72 Ibid. passim. 
73 The Nation, May 18, 1871. 
74 May 18, 1871. 
75 May 18, 1871. 
76 May 18, 1871. 
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England who is tempted to complain "that these rules cannot be ap-
plied to the Confederate Anglo-rebel cruisers, • • • however we 
have nothing to complain of in the agreement; for if England is 
satisfied with the shadow, we ought to be satisfied with the ~­
stance of the principles involved.n77 In an editorial overflow-
ing with praise of the treaty the Baltimore Sun also stresses the 
importance of the "intent" and "due dilige!lce" clauses.78 
"DUE DILIGENCE" CLAUSES 
Frequent reference py the press to the "due diligence" 
cle.uses seems to demand that some special consideration be given 
to this phenomenon of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, since 
these three clauses or stipulations of the treaty clearly reveal 
the fundamental issues underlying the whole diplomatic contro-
versey, it ':':ill be of more than ordinary value to cite and com-
ment on them. They read as follows: 
77 Ibid. 
That a neutral government is bound: 
First, to use due diligence to prevent the 
fitting out, arming or equipping within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has 
reasonable ground to believe is intended to 
cruise or to carry on a war against a Power 
with which it is at peace; and also to use 
like diligence to prevent the departure 
from its jurisdiction of any vessel in-
tended to cruise or carry on war as above, 
78 ra;y-19, 1871. 
r _____ ____, 
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such vessel having been specially adapted, 
in whole or in part, within such jurisdic-
tion, to warlike use. 
Secondly, not to permit or suffer either 
belligerent to make use of its rorts or 
waters as the base of naval operations 
against the other, or for the purpose of 
the renewal or augmentation of military 
supplies or arms, or the recruitment of 
men. 
Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its 
own ports and waters, and as to all persons 
within its jurisdiction, to prevent any vi-
olatio~~f the foregoing obligations and 
duties. 
A careful analysis of these three rules reveals in explicit 
terms the principles demanded by the United States and heretofore 
denied by Great Britain. "If", as an important editorial of the 
Chicago Tribune points out, "with the law thus affirmed, the 
facts do not warrant an award in our favor, then it will show 
that to have resorted to war to maintain a claim so untenable 
would have been a crime against civilization as great as that 
committed by Louis Napoleonn. 80 
But if we may be permitted to paraphrase a press opinion,81 
no such result of arbitration is expected or desired by Great 
Britain. Of all the nr:tions in the world she can least afford to 
79 
80 
81 
Bemis, 2Q•£ii•; 409. The Text of the treaty is cited in full 
here. 
Chicago Tribun~ May 13, 1871. 
This argQ~enta! on is merely a lengthy editor-
. T 1871. 
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have a decision adverse to our claims in the Alabama affair. 
John Stuart Mill well expressed the position of Great Britain 
when he said: "If these claims were to go before arbitrators, 
England must earnestly desire that the decision should be against 
herself, because she could not afford to have the contrary prin-
ciple engrafted into the law of nations". It seems evident from 
the text of the treaty that Great Britain seeks settlement of 
this principle by the arbitration of other nations that it may 
pass into the code of international law recognized by the prin-
cipal powers of the earth. The precise conclusion reached by the 
Chicago Tribune is of some moment: 
Even at the worst, should the judgment be 
against us, the United States will be in the 
same position as now, but freed from all neu-
tral restraints, and free to furnish ships 
of war ••• Great Britain is keenly alive 
to the fact, if she be not liable for the 
damages committed by the Alabama, the first 
time she is engaged in a war, a hundred 
•Alabr.mas" may find their way to the ocean 
from P~erican ports, to prey upon English 
commerce.82 
SECRET SESSIONS CONTI~IDE 
Failure of the Senate to reach an agreement caused the se-
cret sessions to continue. For long hours the merits and de-
merits of ratification were discussed. Meanwhile, the press con-
82 Chicago Tribun~, May 13, 1871. 
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tinued to carry on its vigorous campaign for a speedy ratifica-
tion. To this end the Boston DailY Advertiser featured a lengthy 
editorial entitled "Treaties of Washington 1842 - 1871". It 
painted a glowing picture of Webster's earlier efforts, and of 
the manifold benefits which resulted from the 1842 Treaty that 
bears his name. But now "even greater benefits are our own", it' 
we but ratify the treaty now before the senate. It was a clever 
~ fortiore a.rgument and undoubtedly had its own peculiar influ-
ence in persuading the Senate to action. The article brought out 
the striking fact tha.t: 
in the earlier treaty (1842) Mr. Webster had 
boasted that for its ratification it re-
ceived 5/6 of the votes of the whole Senate, 
a greater majority ••• than ~~s ever before 
found for any disputed treaty. 
Then followed e. well-knit appeal that was at one and the same 
time good logic and good psychology: 
If a treaty is to be ratified et all, the 
greater majority by which it is ratified 
the better, for the sake of the moral in-
fluence in favor of substantial friend-
ship and good will which the hearty ex-
pression of approbation carries with it.84 
This fine bit of reasoning was seconded by a spirited, flag-
waving editorial of the Indianapolis Journal: 
83 May 20, 1871. 
84 Ibid. 
This treaty of washington is one of the high-
est triumphs of civilization. Its effects 
upon the two nations interested will be good, 
and its far-reaching results as an example to 
other nations will ssdound to the permanent 
welfare of mankind. · 
85 
Two days before the actual ratification of the treaty by the 
Senate, two New York journals carried editorials that were inter-
esting insofar as they revealed the real motives for the treaty. 
The New York Tribune elucidated the question of "retroactive 
principles". Their adoption was hailed as a "triumph of American 
principles and diplomacyn.86 On the other hand "while England 
yields the indefensible position she formerly held •• • , ~ 
gains substantially .in ~arantees .o!. !J,lture peac.a .and secnrity.n8 
The New York Herald was most frank in pointing out the pre-
cise reasons why Great Britain made the treaty.88 Were one in-
clined to list these reasons in dramatic fashion, a fine prologue 
~ 
to Britain's action could be written; the action would begin at 
Bull Run. For England the Northern defeat at Bull Run fore-
shadowed the breaking up of the great American union into two or 
three republics 1ike those in South America. Moreover it was 
85 May 18, 1871. 
36 May 22, 1871. 
87 Ibid. 
88 May 22, 1871. The material for the following paragraph is 
drawn from a long editorial in the New York Herald, May 22, 
1871. 
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England's aim, so intimated the Herald, that our institutions 
would be brought into disgrace among all the nations to the ad-
vantage of the "Divine Right of Kings" theory, whereby England 
might hope to gain practical control of political and co~~ercial 
affairs in North America; While England cherished this hope 
within her heart, France at the very same ti~e had her eye glued 
on this country so torn with civil strife. Each day dreams at 
the French court became more vivid. Certainly armed occupation 
and an imperial protectorate in Mexico would be a fine stepping 
stone to actual control of a tottering United States government. 
Fate ruled otherwise. In a few short moments the brief af-
fair under the famous "Appomattox Apple Tree" de·stroyed all those 
great imperialistic expectations of England and France. Louis 
Napoleon, giving up his grand Mexican plans, retired from North 
American soil; England was forced to do some explaining; she pro-
tested that she was honest in her neutrality, and that she felt 
real joy in the success of the Union cause. But it was not until 
the do\~all and outright surrender of the Confederacy that the 
"Alabama Claims" appeared in their proper light. The English 
Foreign Office made out new agenda. First among the items was a 
new diplomHtic policy towards the United States, a policy calcu-
lated to win American peace and good ~. 
In a striking conclusion the New York Herald underscores the 
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telling importance of international politics as the leading fac-
tor in the Treaty of Washington: 
Thus we may safely assume that we are 
in no small degree indebted to the armies 
of Germany for England's satisfactory recog-
nition, at last, of our Alabama Claims. In 
this view there is something amusing in the 
thought that we may trace t:h.is treaty of 
Washington to the Emperor Napoleon's quar-
rel with King William over General Prim's 
nomination of a Hohenzollern as King of 
Spain! But for that quarrel there would 
have been no war, and Napoleon might have 
been this day the recognized arbiter of 
Europe, and still so closely bound up in 
his "entente cordiale" with England on 
American affairs as to make England as im-
perious and as exacting now towards the 
United States as under Palmerston and Rus-
.sell. With the fall of Napoleon on the 
other hand and with the restoration of the 
French Republic, and with the significant 
agitation and progress of popul~r ideas 
which have been followed in England, we 
have the results before us in the satis-
factory peace arrangements of the Joint 
High Commission.89 
It is small wonder then that the Herald held as pure bun-
combe the opinion that the Washington Treaty was due to 'ngreat 
unifying and Christianizi~g forcesn.90 To the Herald it seemed 
more in accord with the evidence to say that "England has gladly 
come to the terms of an 'entente cordiale' with the United S~ates 
89 May 22, 1871. 
90 New York Herald, May 22, 1871. 
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because her late 'entente cordiale' with France is gone, and may 
never more be available as a balance of power against usn.91 
As the work of ,the Committee on Foreign Affairs neared com-
pletion, and the day for the Senatorial vote was at hand, more 
pressure was brought to bear on the fisheries group. This class 
of opponents was urged to waive their objections in favor of im-
mediate ratification. The Boston Daily Advertiser which "felt 
deeply sorry for the great hardship apprehended by our fishermen~ 
\ 
did not relinquish her stand for immediate ratification. This 
organ adopted a very rational position and felt "that we cannot 
shut our eyes to truth and to national interest out of a too 
tender regard for our own local advantagen. 93 On the same day 
the Springfield Republica!\ announced that "despite Massachusetts' 
fishermen protests ••• there seems no probability that the 
treaty will be amendedn.94 Moreover, it was alleged that the 
"general opposition, finding few or no salient points to illus-
trate their position, is content to manifest itself by a silent 
voten.95 
91 Ibid. 
92 May 23, 1871. 
93 Ibid. 
94 May 22, 1871. 
95 Ibid. 
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It is undoubtedly true that popular·opinion in favor of the 
treaty was growing stronger each day. As we have seen in the ten 
day period, May 14 to May 24, in their editorials a large majority 
of newspapers labored to form "public opinion" on the Treaty of 
Washington. In those days as in our own, it was co~~only be-
lieved that "the newspapers of the country are a tolerably reli-
able indicator of the temper of the people unon any given propo-
sitionn.96 It seems safe to say that citizens in 1871 were con-
vinced, {and many share their conviction today) "that no impor-
tant matter submitted for the determination of our authorities 
escapes the criticism of the public voice, ••• and its fate is 
predetermined by the people who are the constitutional sover-
eigns of the Governmentn.97 
Thinking people will be inclined to agree with the editor of 
the Indianapolis Journal who held in high esteem both "public 
opinion", and proper generalizations based on this source of in-
formation. It is t~1e pleasant task of the historian to recapture, 
as far as he-is able, the spirit of another day. Our insight in-
to the 1871 mind has been made possible by the press of the day. 
Perhaps one editor had a premonition of our sentiments when he 
wrote: 
96 Indianapolis Journal, May 15, 1871. A cogent editorial on 
public opinion and the ratification of the treaty". 
97 lQ!£.. 
1!'11 
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It has been interesting to note the reception 
of the treaty with England by the American 
press. The tone of the leading papers is no-
ticeably favorable to its ratification, and 
we may confidently look for an affirmative 
verdict from the Senate ••• 98 
Further on in the same paper we can discover another fine re-
flection of American oninion: 
••• (England's) apology is not to be con-
sidered a small matter. It is the key which 
unfastens the dead-lock heretofore existing, 
and admits us to a consideration of the re- 99 
mainder of the convention in a proper spirit. 
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It h~:is already been pointed out thCJt papers hostile to the 
work of the High Commission based their opposition on the con-
viction that the treaty settles nothing; that it merely provides 
for arbitration, and in such arbitration America is per~itted to 
na~e one judge in five in one case, and one in three in the 
other.lOO In the light of other evidence already presented such 
a statement of the case is manifestly unfair. Further proof 
that the above opinion was considered unjust can be seen in the 
following excerpt: 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
-
• • • for coupled with board of arbit~ation, 
is the settlernent of certain rulP.s and nrin-
ciples which makes the finding of negligence 
against Great Britain the merest matter Q! 
form ••• with the additional agreement 
100 This is a summary of the press opposition as quoted in the 
Indianapolis Journal, May 15, 1871. 
that Great Britain is willing to be adjudged 
by these taiuses (viz. Due Diligence) retro-
actively.-
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The unqualified opposition to the treaty by "loyal" Demo-
crats continued unabated, nevertheless the futility of this type 
of opposition vras well expressed in a nicely balanced editorial: 
The little wind raised by the Washington 
Patriot, by its article presaging the unani-
mous opposition of the Democratic Senators 
to the convention, h8.S blown by without mak-
ing too much stir. The New York World en-
dorses the treaty strongly, and Justice Nel-
son, one of the Co~~issioners, a Democrat in 
whom there is no guile, will be sure to have 
as much influence with his friends in the 
Senate as the editor of the Patriot.l02 
A final and telling blow was directed against opposition of-
fered by sentimental Americans whose opinions were founded on the 
fanciful declaration of damages made by Sumner in his celebrated 
speech on the Johnson-Clarendon treaty. The refutation was 
voiced by a representative editorial which says the present treat : 
is ••• all th~t sober, earnest, practical 
101 l.Q.1.g,. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
men have thought possible. England has con-
fessed her wrong and agreed to pay for it, 
and also has agreed to be governed in the 
future by the rules on international law03ror which we have contended from the first. 1 
r 
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From this vast accumulation of evidence one conclusion 
emerges as certain. Much the greater majority of the American 
press agreed that the general satisfaction of the public would 
avail; and that the treaty would be ratified without amendment. 
11TH HOUR SUPPORT AND RATIFICATION 
At the "11th hour" support for the treaty came from an un-
expected quarter. On May 23, 1871 the Philadelphia Public ~­
~ printed a letter from Reverdy Johnson to Sen~.tor Bayard. It 
was an urgent appeal for ratification. A summary of the com-
munication came to this: 
• • • such a settlement is demanded by the 
prosperity and honor of both nations. He 
(Rev0rdy Johnson) says that in the absence 
of arbitration there are only two courses 
to be pursued, to wit, either continued 
submission to vario~B wrongs, or else a 
declaration of war. 4 
Thirteen gruelling, action-filled hours were needed to 
ratify the great Treaty of Washington. This highly important bit 
of diplomatic history was made on May 24, 1871 between the hours 
of 10:00 A.M. and 11:00 P.M. Press reaction to this momentous 
event began on the very next day. 
The New York World was hapuy over the actual ratification 
104 Phil.;delphia Public Ledger, May 23, 1871. For a discussion 
of Bayard's attitude see c.c. Tansill's Congressional Career 
of Thomas !.Bayard, 53-58. 
Iii! 
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and tacked on the reminder that: 
to General Grant belongs the credit of not 
having thwarted his Secretary of State, but 
if he has any other merit in connection 
with the treaty, the public is unac£gainted 
with the grounds on which it rests. 5 
Two important members of the press analyzed the senatorial 
vote as a definite reflection of party allegiance. The New York 
Herald presumed "that with one or two exceptions, the whole vote 
in the affirmative is Republican, and the whole vote in the nega-
tive is Democratic, the treaty being considered on both sides in 
a party lightn.l06 An apparent paradox was pointed out insofar 
as the Democratic opposition "followed the argument of General 
Butler, a Republican, while the Republicans in their support were 
strengthened by the approving letter of Reverdy Johnson, a Demo-
cratn.l07 In the light of this vote the Herald considered the 
"treaty as more than a party measure. I.t. .i.a a ~eneraJ. hQ.nd. !l.! 
~cen.l08 A more searching analysis was offered by the Spring-
field Republican. For the sake of the record Bowles incorporated 
into his editorial an account of the Senate vote: 
105 May 25, 1871. 
106 May 25, 1871. 
107 ~-
108 Ibid. 
-
11 Democrats and 1 Republican voted against 
the Treaty. 
1 Democrat and 49 Republicans voted for the 
T~eaty. 
2 Democrats and 6 Republicans were absent. 109 
Commenting on these figures Bowles said: 
Several of those who spoke against the treaty 
on some of its details, voted for it as a 
whole, or paired off in its favor. Among 
these were Cobbett (Ore.) and Morrill1 (Vt.), Bayard (Del.) and Vickers (Md.) ••• 10 
The action of the Democratic party in voting against the 
treaty was soundly criticized by more than one paper. The very 
frank question of "why" was asked by the New York Tribune: 
Why did the Democratic party vote against 
the treaty? Even the World, a democratic 
organ, had called the treaty an "honorable 
thing" • • • therefore • • • Why? 
Let tbem (the Democrats) confess that they 
don't want to be on good terms with England; 
th2t the3r want an excuse for liberating Ire-
land someday, and perhaps seizing a few dis-
affected colonies, and getting their hands 
into every European rQw to which Great Brit-
ain may be a party.lll 
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Bitter though the above indictment may seem, nevertheless it 
best describes the counsel given by the Washington Patriot which 
had urged a distinctively American policy "which for a half of 
109 May 26, 1871. 
110 May 26, 1871. 
111 May 26, 1871. 
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century has been a terror to monarchial governmentn.ll2 Follow-
ing the lead of the New York Tr~bune was the Baltimore Sun which 
concluded that "generally the press of the country of all sec-
tions and parties have in the main approved the treatyn.ll3 In 
proof of their contention the editors of the Sun (Baltimore) 
point out how two bitter opponents, namely, the New York World 
and the New York Tribune "buried the hatchet":- "The N.Y. World--
democratic; and the ~· Tribune--republican ••• have united in 
supporting the treatyn. 114 Because it followed party lines and 
personal interests instead of objective truth and the common wel-
fare the Washington Patriot was severely rebuked. A national-
istic outlook was adopted by the New York World: "It matters not 
by whom an agreement is made which promises such beneficial re-
sultsn.ll5 
In the mid-west where the same high tone of nationalism and 
patriotism prevailed, the ratified treaty was hailed as "the new 
and munificent bond of amitynll6 between England and the United 
States. The assurance was given that "the entire affair must be 
112 Quoted in the New York Tribune, May 26, 1871. 
113 Baltimore~' May 27, 1871. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Chicago Eyening Post, May 25, 1871. 
loolced upon by the nations of Europe as ~ noble exan!,l?l.e .o.t: 
paci~ settlementn.117 
Despite continued pressure by the "interested" New England 
fishermen, the Boston Daily Advertiser remained loyal to the 
treaty until it was duly ratified. Two days later a very fair 
and honest estimate of the whole matter appeared in the Adver-
tiser' s edi tori~:Ll column: 
• • • the treaty does not contain all we had 
a right to ask, _ ..... perhaps not all that 
might have been obtained ••• but to reject 
it would none the less have been a great 
calamity • 
• • • the vote of a generous majority of the 
Senate ~ exnres§~~ ~ ~entiment ~ Lha 
nation sU. large • :I'.lJ& .G£ur..enlin e~ .and .the. 
peonlji M .a. !:hole, aem upj ted .ill tbei 1: ~­
nrobation. This state of affairs gives to 
the Tree.ty the moral aspect it ought to wear, 
if its work is not to be left incomplete. 
The high contractir...g powers appear to be con-
sumating ~ ~ a business !~gtract hut a 
measu~ Q! substanti~ unity. 
76 
Even with the tide of public sentiment running strongly 
against them, the Democrats gave out a press release that in the 
guise of an appropriations measure "they were going to carry the 
fight against the treaty to the House of Representatives with the 
hope of making it a rallying cry during the next campaignn. 119 
117 Ibid. 
118 BOSton Dailz Advertiser, May 26, 1871. Underscoring added. 
119 New York Tribune, May 27, 1871. 
'Ill 
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The absence of any editorial comment on the ratification of 
the treaty, made the Charleston Courier and the Louisville 
Courier-Journal conspicuous in their silence. However, "Leo" (a 
special correspondent to the Charleston Courier), under date of 
Mc.y 25 wrote a carefully worded despatch to his paper. In gen-
eral he approved the treatyJ120 he concluded his "special" with 
an interesting political sidelight: "It is regretted that Sena-
tor Casserly of California opposed the treaty, as he did, in a 
long and powerful argument, because he represents, in part, the 
Irish Catholic element of this country as well as the National 
Democratic Partyn. 121 Two days later "Leo" sent a second most 
informative despatch to the Courier and it was nublished on May 
30th. A close reading of this despatch reveals an angle upon 
which everyone else is silent, to wit, the financiG.l gain to be 
reaped from the new treaty. Leo says: 
120 
121 
The conclusion of the treaty will be of grea.t 
benefit to the public credit of the u.s. It 
will remove all prospects of a foreign war, 
the only thing that would threaten the sol-
vency of the goverr~ent, inasmuch as another 
civil war could hardly occur in the same gen-
eration. It~ eXPected a demand~ arise 
in Europ~ for nm! a ,and 4~% .a.tld ~ bonds. 
Secretary of the Treasury Boutwell is about 
Charleston Courier, May 29, 1871. 
Ibid. 
-
to send some of his assistant officials of 
the Treasury over to Europe to do what 
they can tQ~facilitate the negotietion of 
the loan.l2~ 
Not until the sixth day Ffter the Senate's decision that 
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the treaty should become law did the Louisville Courier-Journal 
make editorial ac~nowledgement to the fact. Commenting upon the 
radical diplomacy of the Grant administration the Courier: Journal 
said the equivalent of "sour grapes"; the paper, however, did not 
despair: 
But let us hope that it (the treaty) be 
ratified at once by Her Brittanic Majesty 
so th~t we all may get our Alabama claims, 
and be permitted to catch in the Canadian 
waters all the mackeral, herring, cod and 
cat-fish, shad, salmon and sardines that 
we can possibly consume. When these aims 
shall have been achieved, our government 
will have nothing to do but look after 
the Klu Klux1 ~nd have a high old time at Long Branch. 2 
Such was the picture on this side of the Atlantic. Dem-
ocracy had had her fling. From January to June an independent 
American press frequently aired treaty issues, sometimes to the 
joy, sometimes to the sorrow of the government. On the other 
side of the ocean a similar picture was equally as engaging, but 
press battles were no less frequent. And on the very day on 
which our Senate voted for ratification, the Philadelphia Inauirer 
122 Charleston Courier, May 30, 1871. 
123 Louisville Courier-Journal Mav ~() 18'71 
I 
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carried an editorial which "highlighted" the treaty "in Parlia.-
ment": 
Russell would like to have an opportunity to 
prevent the treaty from being ratified. 
~ Granville and Grey refused to give any 
pledge that the treaty should not be rati-
fied before 12 June~ in order to allow Par-
liament to discuss it. All that was granted 
was that Parliament mi~ht ~ iha right tA 
discuss~ ~reaty after~~ ratified, or 
in other words, that after the deed is done, 
the lords and gentlemen of the British Par-
liament may have full opportunity to indulge 
in as much growling as is necessary to work 
off the constitutional spli2i ~hich period-
ically afflicts John Bull. · 
Now that we have ma.rshalled the evidence, let us turn to 
consider the reaction and interpretation of American historians. 
124 May 24, 1871. 
CONCLUSION 
A goodly number of leading American Historiansl agree that 
the Treaty of Washington and the peaceful adjustment of the 
"Alabama" claims were events of cardinal importance and of last-
ing value. ApRrt from this sweeping generolization most histor-
ical writers are strangely silent. Whatever the reasons, the 
fact rem.~.ins that it has been left to our generation to investi-
gate the causes and circumstances of so significant an event in 
our national history. Previous attempts to determine even those 
general factors which have made possible the Treaty of 1871 have 
been few. Such investigations yielded this two-fold result: 
Some have attached considerable importance to the fact that Eng-
land was caught in the tight net of European poll tics, and hmre 
accepted this as the principal explc:nation of the extremely 
amicable settlement of Uay, 1871; others, while admitting the 
1. Among tr.e more familiE·.r names of those recognized scholars 
who Ere in agreement in this matter we might mention J.S. 
Bassett, E. Channing, llv!. Curti, A.B. Hart, L. Se8rs, A.M. 
Schlessinger, G.M. Stephenson and c. Wittke. These men a.s 
well as others have spoken in highly laudatory terms about 
the treaty. 
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validity of this interpretation, were quick to add that "the 
settlement was effected on business principlesn. 2 And beyond 
this n~ study from the ~~erican point of view has been undertaken. 
These two interpretations, international politics and economic . 
necessity, although valid in themselves, are, nevertheless, quite 
inadequate and throw but faint light on the actual background of 
the Treaty of Washington. 
In view of the need for further research, and for the in-
vestigation of sources yet untapped, this monograph was under-
taken. The evidenc~ has been collected from a selected group of 
leading American newspapers. This selection, though adequate, 
has by no means been exhaustive. The papers chosen represent the 
different sections of the country, and the opinions voiced are 
those of various groups within these sections. The months from 
January to June, 1871 were the period under examination. Unless 
we are gravely in error, the clear mind and the devoted heart of 
the ~~erican people have been eloquent witnesses, and their 
testimony during those months is of more than ordinary signifi-
cance, and hence worthy of careful consideration. It remains, 
then, by way of summary and conclusion, to look for broad pat-
terns sufficiently co~~on in the evidence to justify their being 
2 C.F. Adams, ~ Ireat~ Q! Washin~ton: Before and After, 
(Houghton-Mifflin), 1902; 177. 
cast into significant generalizations on how the Treaty of Wash-
ington came about, and why it merits the historical fame it now 
enjoys. 
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As a start, let us consider the role of territorial factors, 
and this simply because American geography played no little part 
in the successful enactment of the Treaty. On the Atlantic sea-
board the vital interests of the New England fishermen_were not 
to be overlooked. It is undeniable that strong; rough fishermen 
idly hugged the shore, patient in their hope of work with secur-
ity. The press assured us that this picture was not hidden from 
the eyes of sympathetic public servants in Washington, and much 
less did it escape the consideration of our conscientious Secre-
tary of State, Hamilton Fish. What was well known in Boston was 
equally well known in Washington, namely, that unless our differ--
ences with England were settled peacefully, fishing schooners 
would rot at their moorings, and fishermen themselves would face 
starvation. This battle for life was a force which demanded some 
settlement without delay. Another geographical factor which in-
fluenced treaty negotia.tions not a little was the beautiful 
Saint Lawrence River. It happened to be a main link in a chain 
of natural waterways connectir~ Chicago and the middle west with 
the European ports of trade. During this period of Anglo-
American friction the St. Lawrence was closed to all American 
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traffic, and direct trade with Europe ceased. Is it no wonder, 
then, that the financial loss and hardship suffered by the middle 
western states grew until it became a powerful incentive to a 
peace which would mean free trade on the St. Lawrence? The press 
of the mid-west was loud in its P.emands for action, and it held 
before the eyes of its readers an "open" St. Lawrence as the fruit 
of peace with England. If the St. Lawrence had been open to free 
navigation, or if the river simply did not exist, would it be 
mere speculation to say that the Chicago area may well have con-
tented itself with a mere academic interest in this whole diplo-
matic controversey? 
Personalities played no small part in effecting an agreement 
acceptable to both countries. Public opinion testifies that the 
excentionally competent personnel on both sides of the Joint High 
Commission figured largely in the successful solution of our dif-
ficulties. Nor were American citizens permitted to forget that 
the common sense, dignified diplomacy of Hamilton Fish assumed 
even greater value, if, by way of contrast, the failures of Rev-
erdy Johnson and the ravings of the undisciplined Charles Sumner 
were recalled. Conservative editors felt justified in pointing 
out that the American diplomatic corps was a citadel of strength, 
provided it was left unmolested by other branches of the govern-
ment. Consequently no little credit was given to Mr. Fish whose 
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dexterity kept the meddling and military minded President Grant 
out of the council chamber. It is now accepted that Fish steered 
Grant into less dangerous occupations, while he himself guided 
the sessions of the Joint High Commission. 3 There is ample evi-
dence that the public put complete con£idence in the conduct of 
Mr. Fish. Americans expected an equitable treaty from the hands 
of this consummRte statesman. The Treaty of Washington fulfilled 
their fondest hopes. 
On the other hand the representatives of the British govern-
ment were acclaimed with equal appreciation. The American people 
felt gratified that the enlightened liberalism of the Gladstone 
ministry made possible all the itnportant negotiations preliminary 
to peace. For only too recently had the proud and unbending 
spirit of Lord Russell nullified all attempts at reconciliation 
based on compromise and a British expression of regret. The warm 
reception accorded to the British High Co~~issioners ,upon their 
arrival in this country was a candid recognition of their ability. 
Consequently the evidence seems most certainly to warrant the 
conclusion that the persons selected by both governments were so 
well qualified that their very selection was a guarantee of a 
good treaty based on justice and common sense. 
3 Bailey, QQ.cit., 415. 
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A third generalization growing out of the evidence is the 
influence which domestic politics exercised on the final accept-
ance of the treaty. Following party lines the press was divided 
into two camps. On the one side the Republican newspapers clam-
ored consistently for a settlement that would be just, honorable 
and lasting. And in this plea they were joined by the independ-
ent press of the country. To a people so recently torn with civil 
strife the fact was brought home that at last national life was 
flowering and that our country was emerging into a period of new 
national prosperity and international importance: Republicans 
and independents alike urged that nothing should hinder this 
progress. Moreover, since our wealth and credit were so inti-
mately bound up with English and European commerce, the incumbent 
Republican party was most desirous of a swift and amicable set-
tlement of all outstanding difficulties. In a burst of patriotic 
fervor Republican partisans went so far as to hail Grant as an 
enlightened statesman, the memory of whose genius would be im-
mortal, should Anglo-American friendship be cemented during his 
administration. Such editorializing, motivated though it was by 
political propaganda, greatly enhanced the possibility of a suc-
cessful negotiation. 
Yet, in the other camp, the Democrats with their press cam-
paign almost wrecked the work of the Joint High Commission. 
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Wedded to the principle that "nothing Republican was good" the 
Democratic press viewed the treaty in a differe·nt light. Their 
opposition, generally speaking, was based on the hope of regain-
ing national political power and patronage. To this end the 
treaty was indicted as an useless concession made under a weak 
and compromising Republican administration. While berating their 
political opponents, the Democrats were sometimes guilty of slurs 
on the English character. More often, however, outright opposi-
tion was modified to a policy of delay. Democrats realized that 
a rejected treaty in 1871 would probably mean war with England 
and a national crisis such as this would only serve to keep the 
Republican machine in power. They feared that the axiom: "Never 
change horses in the middle of the stream" would be applied to 
Grant as a wartime president. Consequently as it was political 
prudence for the Democrats to follow a policy of "watchful wait-
ing", party organs, for the most part, gave little or no encour-
agement to the treaty negotiations. The one remarkable exception· 
to this policy was the New York World, a democratic paper which 
prided itself on being a staunch advocate of the treaty. 
Not far separated from political considerations were other 
human motives and values which in turn had a marked influence on 
peace efforts. In the case of the Fenian forays at least, these 
human motives came within an ace of being a stumbling block to 
any method of arbitration. On the Canadian border there were 
bands of infuriated Irish partisans whose warlike clubs were 
raised in protest against the violP.tion of Irish rights in the 
home country. Here in America these sympathizers would hear of 
no peaceable settlement with Great Britain. Rather they urged 
and planned a lawless invasion of Canada. 
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Under this same category of human motives and prejudices 
falls the bitter enmity of the South to the proposed settlement. 
A diagnosis of the biased opposition featured by the southern 
press reveals that fires enkindled by sectional hatred were still 
smoldering in 1871. It appears that the erstwhile Confederate 
clung to a remnant of pride in his glorious past. In the eyes of 
radical Southerners to defeat the treaty 'I'Tould be to avenge par-
tially, at least, their own humiliating submission to northern 
arms. Nor 1$ it difficult to understand that to the embittered 
and vanquished Southerner the fishing interests of New England 
and the commerce of the Mid-West meant nothing. As far as this 
treaty was concerned, the States were "united" in name only. 
Other factors there were whose actual influence on the pro-
gress of the treaty was of minor importance. Some had nuisance 
value only, and for our pur<)oses a catalogue of these factors 
will suffice. There were the frequent petty feuds of rival edi-
tors that served only to obfuscate the real issues under con-
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sideration; then the spirit of blind devotion to party principles 
which carried the unknowing along the path of injustice. Nor did 
recourse to sarcasm for sarcasm's sake help matters. These and 
kindred forces were discovered in the nation's press from time to 
time; yet, neither singly nor collectively could they undo the 
persistent efforts of both the United States and Great Britain to 
establish peaceful relations. 
It might be objected, with much justice, th2t no mention has 
been made of "indirect" or "consequential" clai~s. To the stud-
ent of the "Alabama" question this omission might seem to be a 
serious oversight. Yet such is not the case. For, while it is 
true that a year after the treaty was signed a great controversey 
raged over indirect claims, still, during the period under con-
sideration, no one seemed to worry about those fantastic claims. 
Even the Joint High Commissioners in good diplomatic taste 
avoided any discussion of this point. In an article written by 
E.L. Godkin (Nation, June, 1872) there is an excellent indication 
of public opinion on this specific problem. It should be noted 
that the article appeared a year after the treaty had been rati-
fied, and a short time after the Geneva Tribunal had decided 
against the admission of any indirect claims. Godkin's article 
carrying the title "Public Opinion on the Treaty" is representa-
tive, and merits partial quotation. Godkin wrote that the Grant 
admi ni s tra tion: 
• • • conceived the idea of clai~ing conse-
quential damages in the case, even to the 
extent of the cost of war and indeed every-
thing for which the wildest imagination in 
the country ever dreamed of holding Great 
Britain liable, bringing the claim before 
the Tribunal in the full certainty that it 
would be rejected, turning around to the 
voters and saying: "You see we demanded 
everything of Great Britain we could think 
of or that you ever thought of, but the 
Tribunal has decided against us; there is, 
therefor4, no use in talking about it any 
further. 
89 
It is interesting to note that Godkin puts full blame for this 
controversy on the rather clu.111sy way in l'.'hlch the Administration 
was trying to satisfy what it thought was public opinion: 
The yublic, we assert with confidence, had 
no expectation of hearing one word more 
about the consequential damages after the 
treaty was published, and was perfectly 
satisfied with any disposition which the 
American Commissioners made of them. These 
Commissioners were distinguished jurists in 
whom the people had thorough confidence, 
and if they declared that there was nothing 
to be said about indirect claims, nobody 
• would have r.1entioned them or have expected 
them to be mentioned again.5 
In Godkin's analysis we have a reasonable solution of what 
otherwise might be a puzzle. Although it was true that much ink 
was spilt in spirited writings on the indirect claims, still the 
4 Nation, June 20, 1872; 401. 
5 Godkin, 2ll•£1i• 402 ff. 
American press in 1871 found no need to do so. The fact of the 
matter is that the great majority of leading editors by-passed 
the whole issue. And in this we may imitate them. 
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One mig~t profitably raise the question: Is there any evi-
dent evolution or mental growth in the press attitude on the 
Treaty of Washington? Vfhile the answer is strongly in the af-
firmative, a distinction must be introduced. As far as party 
newspapers are concerned a very consistent editorial policy ob-
tained from January to May, 1871, but there was no appreciable 
growth or change, unless one considers the increasing vehemence 
with which initial opinions were maintained. However, the inde-
pendent press manifested a steady growth in the intelligent 
handling of various treaty issues. In the first class, or the 
party organs, there were on the one hand the professedly Republi-
can journals. These bespoke nothing but praise for every move of 
the Joint High Commission and for the actual text of the treaty. 
On the other hand the Democratic press was consistently hostile. 
Dismissing, then, the evident bias ~anifested by the papers 
of both political parties, we turn our attention to the independ-
ent press of the nation. Here we find, week by week, a more ma-
ture handling of the difficult problems confronting the Joint 
High Commission. Throughout Jan~ary and early February these 
papers were strongly suspicious of failure, or at least only 
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frigid in their hope f0r success. But the turning point was the 
release of the Fish-Thornton correspondence on the successful pre-
liminary negotiations. Once the High Commission became a reality, 
the independent press grew steadily more friendly and more hope-
ful. Mention of previous unpleasant international incidents dis-
appeared, and all suspicions of new intrigue were quieted. Pro-
gressively the editorials become more positive. The benefits of 
two civilized nations living in peace and justice were extolled, 
and the savagery of useless warfare condemned. Strong emphasis 
was placed on the community of interests between two English 
speaking nations, and simultaneously former estrangements and dif-
ferences were minimized and even forgotten. It is undoubtedly 
true that the independent press became increasingly more conscious 
of the many important issues underlying the "Alabama" settlement. 
The editorials which appeared during April and May reflectEd this 
growth quite clearly. Serious consideratlon was given to the 
benefits of internGtional ~rbitration and to the universal desir-
ability of a fixed code of internc.tional law. Moreover, apt argu-
ments were presented on the need of subordinating,commercial and 
sectional interests lest the welfe.re of the human person and human 
society be obscured and thus neglected. It is not too difficult 
to sum up this phenomenal growth in press attitude. Incredulous-
ness yielded to the practical confidence thc.t justice and right 
reason could prevail. It is the hapny fact that under such 
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circumstances as these the Treaty of Washington was born. 
Thus the story behind the Treaty of Washington stands re-
vealed. Not only is its value and importance as a landmark in the 
history of arbitration confirmed, but also many of the factors 
underlying the Treaty are now made plain. The evidence permits 
us to conclude that the peaceful adjustment of the "Alabama" 
claims was not due solely to the press of European politics. Nor 
was the English love for pragmatic and expeditious diplomacy the 
only guiding spirit behind the Treaty of V'tashington. Rather it 
is more proper to say that the voice of public opinion has 
established the truth of the generalization: that rarely does a 
single cause oper~te with equal force in all sections of a 
country or in the minds of all in any one district. For, if it 
may be said that a complexity of human agents with varying human 
motives and values was responsible for the war for P~erican in-
dependence and the War of 1812, so like~:vise may the same opinion 
be expressed about a third Anglo-t,merican conflict which was 
forestalled by the Treaty of Washington on May 24, 1871. 
'~en one surveys the present turmoil, perhaps no more fit-
ting conclusion could be made to this study than to call atten-
tion to the excellent observation of E.L. Godkin on this very 
Treaty of Washington. He maintained that "if we knew more of 
the facts of the foreign policy of the goverrnnent, .2.lli! even two 
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21: three ~ ,:tl& ,greEt newspaper a .g.a.t. ill .the. hahi t !l!. di scn~si ng 
ih.§illl, not for the good of the party, but for the enlightem.ent or 
the natlon, we should have no more imbroglios •• • n6 After 
seventy-five years tJ:lis sober observetion still carries a lesson 
instructive to historian and statesman alike: An er~ig:btened 
public will tend to choose peace over a conference table rather 
than death and misery on the field of battle. 
6 Nation, June 20, 1872; 402 (Underscoring added). 
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of the thesis and the signatm·e which appears below verifies 
the fact that any necessary chanses I:ave been inco:e:poratecL, 
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